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Activities in northern offshore regions are increasing due to proven reserves of natural 
resources. These regions are considered to have a harsh marine environment due to 
extreme weather conditions, namely low temperatures, frequent storms and the presence 
of sea ice. In general these activities are moving further offshore. Thus many new 
developments are faced with operations in extreme environments at long distances from 
shore support. Design, operational and regulatory planning for such offshore installations 
must consider the environmental challenges along with additional difficulties that arise 
due to remoteness.  
 
The most significant aspects of an offshore development that are affected by the factors of 
environment and remoteness, are the logistical support functions required for daily 
operations and the rapid response required for emergencies. In the early stages of design 
it would be beneficial to have a means of assessing the high risk elements of such 
operations and the risk reduction cost effectiveness of proposed solutions. 
 
This study presents an end-to-end risk reduction analysis of the logistical support 
functions for a typical remote harsh-environment offshore operation including; risk 
assessment to provide identification of most significant risks, risk reduction modeling and 
development of  a solution to provide the identified most effective reduction strategy, and 
finally a cost benefit analysis  that includes the costed initial risk factors, the solution cost 




This research serves three functions. It develops a procedure for evaluating offshore 
operations that have inherently high logistical risks due mainly to distance but also 
applicable to other factors. It provides a risk analysis based solution to the specific 
problem of remote operations in harsh environments. Finally it develops a method of 
determining the utility of a possible solution or of alternative solutions through rational 
risk based cost analysis. 
 
The study is divided into four phases, Risk Analysis, Risk Reduction, Specific Solution 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis. In phase one – risk analysis, an advanced probabilistic model 
is developed using fault trees to identify the main contributing factors of the logistical 
challenges. A fuzzy-based and evidence-based approach is implemented to address 
inherent data limitations. It is found that existing modes of logistics support such as 
marine vessel or helicopter are not sufficiently reliable and quick for remote offshore 
operations. Moving towards in phase two – risk reduction, a conditional dependence-
based Bayesian model is developed that has integrated multiple alternative risk reduction 
measures. The analysis depicts that a nearby offshore refuge and an additional layer of 
safety inventory are found to the most effective measures. In phase three – specific 
solution, the concept of a moored vessel, which is termed as offshore resource centre 
(ORC) is proposed that can meet the functions of both these measures. The overall 
dimensions of the ORC are derived based on the functional requirements and the model is 
validated for stability and mooring requirements. In phase four – cost-benefit analysis, the 
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life cycle costs of an ORC is estimated from historical vessel data using regression 
analysis. A loss model is developed for a hypothetical blowout incident, which is a 
function response time and the distance from shore support. These models are integrated 
into a single framework that can project the costed risk with or without the ORC. The 
analysis reveals that an ORC becomes more and more viable when the offshore distance 
becomes longer and if there is a higher probability of any platform incident, recognizing 
that it is desirable to keep the probability as low as possible. Taken together these phases 
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1.1 Problem statement 
Harsh offshore environments are characterized by extreme weather conditions, which are 
not favorable for human, infrastructure or habitat (Khan et al., 2014a). Northern ocean 
frontiers have the harshest environmental conditions with the presence of various ice 
features, extreme cold temperature, freezing rain, high wind and waves, and marine fog 
(Walsh, 2008; Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2009; Hamilton, 2011; Meling, 2013; 
Necci et al., 2019). In addition, these regions, including the high Arctic, are most often 
also located at long distances from established large communities and infrastructure.  
 
However, these regions contain proven and speculative reserves of hydrocarbons and 
mineral resources leading to increased interest from the oil and gas and mining industries 
(Tellier, 2008). Exploration and development of natural resources in these regions faces 
significant safety and integrity challenges, which are identified as the lack of details in 
construction and operation standards, restricted operating conditions, presence of 
different ice features such as pack ice and icebergs, remoteness, human factors, and 
knowledge and data scarcity (Khan et al., 2014b). There are several standards and 
practices such as ABS 2010, ISO 19906:2010, NORSOK S-002, and Barents 2020 that 
provide guidance for operations in harsh environments. However, there is a lack of design 
and operational guidelines or experience for further north, which must consider the 




2013). Planning for normal logistics supply, and support during emergencies, is an 
important aspect of any resource development and a key part of regulatory evaluation. 
There is a need to be able to assess risk and develop new strategies and technologies prior 
to launching operations in these regions (Milaković et al., 2014; Malykhanov and 
Chernenko, 2015; Borch, 2018; Uthaug, 2018).     
 
Logistics operations are conducted to transport personnel and to provide routine supplies 
as well as emergency support to recover from hazardous incidents. The sequence of 
activities involved in the process of an emergency logistics operation is presented in 
Figure 1.1. This process consists of the following phases: departure readiness of a vessel 
when an incident has been reported, an uninterrupted voyage, functionality of on-board 
equipment, arrival at the site within the desired time limit and on-site operation. A 






Figure 1.1: Logistics operation or emergency response (ER) process 
 
1.2 Knowledge and technological gaps 
Logistics for offshore operations is, in the majority of cases, provided by supply vessels 
and/or helicopters. In general, marine vessels are used for transporting materials and 
supplies from an onshore supply base to support offshore exploration activities. 
Helicopters are used to transport personnel and light cargo to and from offshore 
platforms. Besides the routine logistics for supply, the role of emergency response (ER) is 
to support emergency evacuation should the platform need to be abandoned. Prompt 
response, which can be critical due to the distance and environment, is required to 




Faster response can be provided by helicopter than by support vessel but the use of 
helicopter is limited when the distance is too long (beyond helicopter reach), and subject 
to adverse weather conditions. Also, helicopters cannot be used if the platform itself is 
sinking or any situation that is not safe for the helicopter to land or winch.  
 
Accident rates in the offshore helicopter industry are still at least one order of magnitude 
greater than those of commercial fixed-wing operations (Oil & Gas UK, 2017; OGP, 
2010). The crash of a helicopter is almost always a very serious event - often leading to 
fatalities and serious economic loss (Sutton, 2014; Okstad et al., 2012; Olsen and Lindøe, 
2009; Hokstad et al., 2001; Vinnem, 2011, 2010). Baker et al. (2011) published an article 
on helicopter crashes related to oil and gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico, where an 
average of 6.6 crashes occurred per year during 1983 – 2009 and resulted in a total of 139 
fatalities. During that period, bad weather led to a total of 29 crashes, which accounted to 
40% of the 139 deaths. According to the Civil Aviation Authority and Oil & Gas UK 
records, there were 73 UK Continental Shelf offshore commercial air transport (CAT) 
accidents reported from 1976 to 2013 in which a total of 119 fatalities occurred. 11% of 
these accidents occurred due to external factors such as icing, turbulence, wind shear, 
thunderstorm, or bird strike. These problems are particularly acute at night, when the 
accident rates are considerably higher than those in the daytime. Knowledge of the 
hazards and risks associated with such accidents is very limited (Ross and Gibb, 2008). 
This is aggravated by the expected increase in nighttime or low light offshore helicopter 




polar regions (Nascimento, 2014). Marine vessels could become the only mode for 
transportation if these circumstances lead to unacceptably high risk. The feasibility of 
marine logistics operations in remote harsh environments is not well-understood (Khan et 
al., 2014a, 2014b). A marine logistics operation can be hampered by many factors, such 
as equipment failure, operational and navigational failure, failure due to the prevailing 
environment, human related error, etc. Logistics support failure due to inadequate voyage 
plans has been addressed in detail by Kum and Sahin (2015). Working in northern regions 
can endanger the crew unless proper preparations are made to equip both vessel and crew 
for operating in cold, dark, and icy conditions. The reliability information about 
lifesaving appliances in ice-covered regions is presented in Bercha et al. (2003). Faulty 
equipment in any system of a ship may result in operation failure (Antao et al., 2006). 
Navigational failure may occur for many reasons including radar failure, control error, 
propulsion system failure, human error, or difficulties arising from prevailing weather 
conditions such as poor visibility. Probabilistic assessment of a ship’s navigational failure 
is presented by Pietrzykowski (2007) and Amrozowicz et al. (1997).  
 
The term “risk” refers to the probability of an undesirable event and its consequence to 
people, property and environment. Various modelling techniques are available to assess 
the risk of a system qualitatively or quantitatively in which Fault Tree (FT) or Bayesian 
Networks (BN) are commonly used. However, choosing the right approach is key for 
useful risk assessment (Crowl and Louvar, 2002; Andrews and Moss, 2002; Modaress, 




relationship with possible causes that can contribute to the system or component failure. 
A system failure is referred to as a “top event” and all primary causes are defined as basic 
events, which are connected by logic gates in the FT. Basic events have binary states, i.e., 
success/failure, and are considered as mutually independent (Khakzad et al., 2011). There 
are several forms of logic gates that determine the effects of the basic events; the AND-
gate and OR-gate are most commonly used in the FT. A fault tree is usually adapted to its 
top event and includes only the most credible faults as assessed by the risk analyst(s) and 
may not represent all possible system failure causes (Vesely et al., 1981). Amrozowicz et 
al. (1997); Kum and Sahin (2015); Laskowski (2015); Pietrzykowski (2007) present the 
application of fault trees to analyze marine accidents.  
 
A Bayesian Network is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that satisfies the Markovian 
condition. A DAG is a directed graph with no cycles and the Markovian condition for 
Bayesian network states that every node in a Bayesian network is conditionally 
independent of its non-descendants, given its parents. A DAG consists of two sets: the set 
of nodes and the set of directed edges. In a BN, nodes represent random variables while 
the edges represent conditional relationships (casual relationships) between the connected 
nodes (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Ben-Gal, 2007). Several studies are found in the 
literature that apply BN to analysis various types of marine accidents (Afenyo et al., 
2017; Hänninen, 2014). However, no studies are found that have conducted formal risk 





Based on the literature review, the main logistics issues in a remote platform operating in 
harsh environment are identified as: 
- There are two modes for logistics operation: helicopter and marine vessels. 
Helicopter operation is limited by the environmental conditions and remoteness. 
Long-distance operation of helicopters is particularly risky.  
- Marine vessels are relatively reliable and versatile alternative to helicopters. 
Although, quick response is not possible by a vessel from an onshore base to 
remote locations.  
- Risk associated with regular and emergency marine logistics operation is not well-
quantified or understood as no publicly available formal risk analysis has been 
conducted to date. 
- There is considerable uncertainty associated with operations and risk assessment 
for remote harsh environments due to the lack of operational experience in such 
operating conditions. 
- A viable solution is yet to be developed to address the logistics challenges of 
harsh environment remote offshore development. 
1.3 Summary and Research Hypothesis 
In summary, there are two significant levels of problem identified in the literature 
associated with development of increasingly distant and harsh offshore projects. A 
significant high level problem is the lack of a risk based methodology to evaluate the 




the low level problem is a lack of well-developed concept solutions for the problem of 
long travel distances from shore base to offshore site. 
 
The goal of this research is to address these two problems by setting up a more general 
risk analysis methodology and evaluating the methodology by performing a specific case 
study. This will consist of an in-depth study to identify the challenges of offshore 
logistics operations, assessing risk, and developing a feasible solution to the identified 
logistics issues, all focused on the specific case of a remote harsh environment 
installation. The work is concentrated on logistical supports and operations as this is 
identified in the literature as the longest term and most risk-prone stage in the life of an 
offshore development. Figure 1.2 illustrates the organization of the thesis that includes the 






Figure 1.2: Objectives of this research 
The research is divided into four phases in which each phase addresses one of the 
objectives identified in Figure 1.2. In phase one, a risk model is developed to find the 
most significant factors related to failure of a marine logistics support operation in a 
remote harsh environment. A probabilistic approach is adopted using advanced fault-
trees, which is integrated with fuzzy logic theory and evidence theory to address the 
limitation of existing data. This work serves to identify the higher risk aspects of the 
logistics operations for remote offshore developments and to improve the methodology 





In the second phase, a framework is developed to identify the most effective risk 
reduction measures for logistics operations. A Bayesian approach is implemented in this 
framework that considers the interdependencies among the contributing risk factors. This 
work introduces the idea of conditional dependence as a means of improving the risk 
reduction analysis procedure. 
 
In the next phase of this research, using the knowledge gathered from the phase 1 and 
phase 2 analyses, a specific solution in the form of an intermediate offshore resource 
centre (ORC) is proposed for effective risk reduction. This novel solution is conceived as 
a practical means of providing the most effective risk reduction measure to address the 
identified highest risk aspects of a logistics operation in a remote harsh environment. 
 
 In phase four, the research develops a cost-benefit analysis procedure for the proposed 
solution that can guide decision making to assess the feasibility of any proposed risk 
reduction measure. This provides a novel engineering economics approach to assessing 
the viability of a proposed risk reduction strategy. As a case study using the developed 
methodology, the costed risk of a hypothetical offshore blowout incident is estimated 
using a loss function developed based on historical blowout events. The capital and 
operating costs of the solution proposed in phase 3 are estimated and the net benefit, 
expressed in economic terms, of the risk reduction strategy is presented. This provides 





The Flemish Pass Basin is chosen as the case study location. This drilling location is 
approximately 500 nautical miles east of St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador. The 
water depths in this area range from 500 to over 3,000 m (Project Description Summary – 
Equinor, 2016). Figure 1.3 shows the location of Flemish Pass drilling project. This 
region exhibits harsh environmental conditions including intense storms and the presence 
of ice (sea ice and icebergs). The distance between the onshore supply base and the 




Figure 1.3: Exploration drilling location in the Flemish Pass Basin (Source: Canadian 





1.4 Novelty and contribution 
This research identifies the logistical challenges of remote offshore operation in harsh 
environments. The contributions includes new methodology to better understand the risk 
profile of a new development scenario with minimal background data, formal analysis 
process with better understanding of conditional dependence to evaluate possible 
measures to overcome these challenges. The work also develops a unique practical 
solution to the logistical problem, in the form of the ORC Concept, and finally provides a 
novel method of evaluating the cost effectiveness of this or any proposed risk reduction 
measure. A brief description of the contributions and novelties of this research is provided 
below. 
Logistics risk model development 
A novel marine logistics risk model is developed to support offshore operations is 
challenging environmental conditions. The model identifies and considers key failure 
modes and develops appropriate failure models. The model relaxes the assumption of 
independence of causes. Data and model uncertainties are considered. Application of the 
proposed model is demonstrated through a case-study concerning a remote North Atlantic 
offshore operation. 
Solution for logistics risk 
A Bayesian network (BN) based risk model is developed to consider interdependencies 




failure. Appropriate risk management strategies are proposed to support marine logistics 
operations. This allows identification and ranking of the major sources of risk. 
Concept development of proposed solution 
An intermediate offshore resource centre (ORC) as a potential solution to the logistics 
problem is presented. A vessel or platform of this type and functionality has not been 
previously developed or proposed. The purpose, functional requirements and the 
conceptual design of an ORC are discussed. A modular volume-limited ship design 
concept is adopted to determine the principal particulars of the ORC. The concept design 
of the ORC is tested and validated for the vessel stability and mooring requirements. 
Framework for risk-based cost-benefit analysis 
A new framework is developed for risk-based cost-benefit analysis that helps to assess the 
net financial cost or benefit of using a system, such as an ORC, as a risk reduction 
strategy for remote offshore developments. This presents a structured but flexible 
approach that can be easily modified for different scenarios. The methods can be applied 
to any potential risk mitigation system.  
1.5 Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is written in manuscript format that includes four journal papers as chapters. 
Table 1.1 shows the papers written during the course of this research and establishes their 




Table 1.1: Organization of the thesis 
Papers as chapters Research objectives Associated tasks 
Chapter 1: Introduction.  
Not applicable for 
publication. 
 To specify Problem statement of 
offshore logistics support operation.   
 To present overall research objectives 
and organization of the thesis. 
 Conduct literature review.  
 Identify knowledge gaps.  
 Define research objectives and research hypothesis. 
Chapter 2: Development of 
risk model for marine 
logistics support to 
offshore oil and gas 
operations in remote and 
harsh environments.  
 To develop a framework for formal 
risk analysis of logistical problem.  
 To provide an understanding of 
associated risk. 
 Identify key challenges from literature survey. 
 Develop probabilistic risk model using advance fault trees.  
 Identify model and data limitations.  
 Address data uncertainty using fuzzy theory and evidence 
theory. 
Chapter 3: A conditional 
dependence-based marine 
logistics support risk 
model.  
 To identify potential risk reduction 
measures. To assess the feasibility of 
each measure. 
 Develop a conditional dependence-based risk model that 
integrates reduction measures.  
 Address data limitation using evidence-based approach. 
Detect effective measure using sensitivity analysis. 
Chapter 4: Conceptual 
development of an 
offshore resource centre in 
support of remote harsh 
environment operations. 
 To develop the concept of the 
identified viable measure (Offshore 
resource centre) from previous study. 
 Define functional requirements for logistics support 
operation.  
 Identify suitable platform to meet this purpose. Concept 
design of offshore resource centre.  




Table 1.1: Organization of the thesis (continued) 
Papers as chapters Research objectives Associated tasks 
Chapter 5: Risk-Based 
Cost Benefit Analysis of 
Offshore Resource Centre 
to Support Remote 
Offshore Operations in 
Harsh Environment. 
 To develop a framework to assess 
economic viability of offshore resource 
centre. 
 Estimate cost of the ORC using historical ships data. 
Develop loss function of an accident scenario (blowout). 
Benefit measured as the reduction of cost a blowouts due 
to ORC.  
 Cost-benefit comparison. Analyze sensitivity of blowout 
probability with the net risk reduction. 
Chapter 6: Summary, 
Conclusion and Future 
Works.  
Not applicable for 
publication. 
 To provide a summary, outcome of 
this research and recommendations for 
future work. 
 Conclusion drawn from the overall study.  





An outline of each chapter is presented below. 
Chapter 2 identifies the risk contributing factors of marine logistics operation in a remote 
harsh environment. An advanced fault tree analysis is used to develop the logical 
relationships among these factors and a sensitivity analysis is conducted to rank the most 
critical factors that cause emergency response failure. The fault-tree model is integrated 
with fuzzy logic theory and evidence theory to address the limitation of existing data.  
 
Chapter 3 presents a Bayesian network model that establishes a causal relationship among 
factors contributing to offshore logistics risk and possible risk reduction measures. A 
framework is developed to identify the most effective risk reduction measures for 
logistics operations. An uncertainty analysis is conducted based on evidence theory to 
address inherent data limitation.  
 
Chapter 4 proposes a specific solution in the form of an intermediate offshore resource 
centre (ORC) for effective risk reduction based on the most critical factors identified in 
Chapter 3. The functional requirements of an ORC are defined in an aim to reduce 
logistical risk of remote offshore operation in challenging environments. Conceptual 
development of the ORC includes overall sizing estimation and validation of preliminary 
stability and mooring requirements.  
 
Chapter 5 provides a framework for risk-based cost-benefit analysis. The cost model is 




using regression analysis.  The benefit model is expressed as a loss function of blowout 
incidents, which is a function of response time and the distance from the nearest logistics 
support. This study presents an integrated framework that evaluates the net benefit, 
expressed in economic terms, of the risk reduction strategy is presented. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a summary of key developments and conclusions. It 
presents recommendations for potential future work. 
 
A co-authorship statement is provided at the beginning of each chapter. The statement 
describes the contribution of each author in different stages of the research. 
References 
Afenyo, M., Khan, F., Veitch, B., & Yang, M. (2017). Arctic shipping accident scenario 
analysis using Bayesian Network approach. Ocean Engineering, 133, 224–230. 
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng. 2017.02.002. 
Amrozowicz, M., Brown, A.J., Golay, M., 1997. Probabilistic analysis of tanker 
groundings. International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference. Honolulu, 
Hawaii. 
Andrews, J.D. and Moss, T.R., 2002, Reliability and Risk Assessment, Publisher: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
Antao, P. and Soares, C.G., 2006. Fault-tree Models of Accident Scenarios of RoPax 




Arctic Council, 2009. Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment 2009 Report. Available 
at:https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-
zone/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf, Accessed: December, 
2019. 
Baker, S. P., Shanahan, D. F., Haaland, W., Brady, J. E., & Li, G. (2011). Helicopter 
crashes related to oil and gas operations in the Gulf of Mexico. Aviation Space and 
Environmental Medicine, 82(9), 885-889. DOI: 10.3357/ASEM.3050.2011. 
Ben-Gal, I., 2007. Bayesian Networks. In: Ruggeri, F., Faltin, F., Kenett, R. (Eds.), 
Encyclopedia of Statistics in Quality and Reliability. John Wiley and Sons, New 
York. 
Bercha, F.G., 2003. Escape, evacuation, and rescue research project phase II., Report for 
Transportation Development Centre Transport Canada, Available 
at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=E05FE72D947CF92D50
A2162CE4888206?doi=10.1.1.120.5848&rep=rep1&type=pdf, Accessed: September 
2019. 
Borch, O.J., 2018. Offshore service vessels in high arctic oil and gas field logistics 
operations. FoU-rapport nr, 22 (2018) Bodø 2018. 
Crowl, D.A., and Louvar, J.F., 2002. Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals with 
Applications, Prentice Hall Publication Inc. 
Hamilton, J.M., 2011. The challenges of deep water arctic development. Proceedings of 
the Twenty-first (2011) International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference 




Hänninen, M., 2014. Bayesian networks for maritime traffic accident prevention: Benefits 
and challenges. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION, (73), 305312. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2014.09.017. 
Hokstad, P., Jersin, E., Sten, T., 2001, A risk influence model applied to North Sea 
helicopter transport, December 2001, Reliability Engineering System Safety 
74(3):311-322, DOI: 10.1016/S0951-8320(01)00083-7. 
Jensen, F.V. and Nielsen, T.D., 2007, Bayesian Networks and Decision Graphs, 2nd 
edition, Springer, ISBN-10: 0-387-68281-3. 
Khakzad, N., Khan F, and Amyotte, P., 2011, Safety analysis in process facilities: 
Comparison of fault tree and Bayesian network approaches. Journal of Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety 96 (2011) 925–932. 
Khan, F., Ahmed, S., Hashemi, S.J., Yang, M., Caines, S., Oldford, D., 2014. Integrity 
challenges in harsh environments: Lessons learned and potential development 
strategies. Inst. Chem. Eng. Symp. Ser. 1–7. 
Khan, F., Ahmed, S., Yang, M., Hashemi, S. J., Caines, S., Rathnayaka, S. and Oldford, 
D., 2014. Safety challenges in harsh environments: Lessons learned. Proc. Safety 
Prog., 34: 191–195. doi:10.1002/prs.11704. 
Kum, S. and Sahin, B., 2015. A root cause analysis for Arctic Marine accidents from 
1993 to 2011. Safety Science, Volume 74, Pages 206-220. 
Laskowski, R., 2015, Fault Tree Analysis as a tool for modelling the marine main engine 
reliability structure, Scientific Journals of the Maritime University of Szczecin, 2015, 




Lin, Ching-Torng and Wang, Mao-Jiun J., 1997, Hybrid fault tree analysis using fuzzy 
sets, Reliability Engineering and System Safety 58 (1997) 205-213. 
Malykhanov, A.A. and Chernenko, V.E., 2015. Strategic planning of logistics for 
offshore arctic drilling platforms supported by simulation. Proceedings of the 2015 
Winter Simulation Conference, Huntington Beach, CA (2015). 
Meling, T.S., 2013. Deepwater floating production systems in harsh environment - a look 
at a field development offshore Norway and need for technology qualification. OTC 
Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (2013) 29-31 October 
Milaković, A.S., Ehlers, S., Westvik, M.H., Schütz, P., Offshore upstream logistics for 
operations in arctic environment, 2015, MTEC 2014 - International Maritime and Port 
Technology and Development Conference, Trondheim. 
Modaress, M., 2006, Risk Analysis in Engineering: Techniques, Tools, and Trends, CRC 
press, ISBN 9781574447941. 
Nascimento, F. A. C., 2014, Hazard identification and risk analysis of nighttime offshore 
helicopter operations, Ph.D. thesis, Imperial College London, UK. 
Necci, A., Tarantola, S., Vamanu, B., Krausmann, E., Ponte, L., 2019. Lessons learned 
from offshore oil and gas incidents in the Arctic and other ice-prone seas. Ocean Eng. 
185, 12–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2019.05.021. 
OGP, Safety Performance Indicators 2011 data, 2012. International association of oil & 





Okstad, E., Jersin, E., Tinmannsvik, R.K., 2012. Accident investigation in the Norwegian 
petroleum industry – common features and future challenges. Saf Sci, 50 (6) (2012), 
pp. 1408-1414. 
Olsen, O.E. and Lindøe, P.H. Risk on the ramble: The international transfer of risk and 
vulnerability, Safety Science, 2009, 47, (6), pp. 743-755. 
Pietrzykowski, Z., 2007, Assessment of Navigational Safety in Vessel Traffic in an Open 
Area, International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, 
vol. 1, no. 1, March 2007. 
Project Description Summary - Statoil Canada Ltd., 2016. Available at: 
https://www.statoil.com/en/news/efficient-exploration-offshore-newfoundland.html. 
Accessed: June 2016. 
Reportable Accidents, Civil Aviation Authority and Oil & Gas UK records, 2017. 
Available at: https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Appendix-
1_Reportable-Helicopter-Accidents-2017.pdf. Accessed: September 2019. 
Ross, C. and Gibb, G. (2008). A Risk Management Approach to Helicopter Night 
Offshore Operations [Online]. Available: http://asasi. 
Sutton, I., 2014. Offshore safety management implementing a SEMS program. 
Elsevier, USA (2014). 
Tellier, F.B., 2008. The Arctic: Hydrocarbon Resources, Parliament of Canada 
publication, PRB 08-07E. 
Vesely W.E, Goldberg F.F., Roberts N.H., Haasl D.F., 1981. Fault Tree Handbook. U.S. 




Vinnem, J.E. Evaluation of offshore emergency preparedness in view of rare accidents, 
Safety Science, 2011. 49, (2), pp. 178-191. 
Vinnem, J.E. Risk indicators for major hazards on offshore installations, Safety Science, 








2. Development of Risk Model for Marine Logistics Support to 
Offshore Oil and Gas Operations in Remote and Harsh 
Environments 
Md Samsur Rahman, Faisal Khan, Arifusalam Shaikh, Salim Ahmed, and Syed Imtiaz 
Centre for Risk, Integrity and Safety Engineering (C-RISE) 
Faculty of Engineering & Applied Science 
Memorial University, St John’s, NL, Canada A1B 3X5 
Co-authorship statement 
A version of this manuscript has been published in Ocean Engineering. The lead author 
Md Samsur Rahman performed the literature review, developed the fault trees for the 
offshore logistics support risk model, collected failure probability data, performed the 
model analysis, generated the results, and prepared the draft of the manuscript. The co-
author Faisal Khan helped in developing and testing the risk models, reviewed and 
corrected the models and results, and contributed in preparing, reviewing and revising the 
manuscript. The co-author Arifusalam Shaikh also helped in the development of the 
model. All co-authors including Salim Ahmed and Syed Imtiaz reviewed and provided 
feedback on the manuscript. Md Samsur Rahman revised the manuscript based on the co-






Reference: Rahman, M.S., Khan, F., Shaikh, A., Ahmed, S., Imtiaz, S., 2019. 
Development of risk model for marine logistics support to offshore oil and gas operations 
in remote and harsh environments, Ocean Engineering, 174. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oceaneng.2019.01.037. 
Abstract 
Logistics support to offshore operations is challenging, especially under severe 
environmental conditions such as those in the Arctic and sub-Arctic. The dominant 
environmental conditions, including waves, wind, poor visibility and the presence of 
icebergs and sea ice determine the mode and success of logistics support. Use of 
helicopters as a mode of logistics transport becomes ineffective when the distance is 
longer, the visibility is low, or the weather is stormy. Marine logistics support is more 
reliable and versatile. The present work focuses on developing a model for assessing risk 
associated with marine logistics operations in remote offshore locations (beyond 
helicopter reach) frequented with harsh environmental conditions. The key factors that 
affect such operations are identified and failure models are developed. As an 
improvement, advance fault trees are adopted to relax the inherent limitations of the 
primary model. Uncertainties in both data and model are considered using the fuzzy 
inference system and evidence theory. Application of the proposed model is demonstrated 
through a case-study concerning a remote North Atlantic offshore operation. The 
contribution of this study is the identification of the key factors and a robust risk model to 




Keywords: Logistics risk, offshore safety, fault tree analysis, fuzzy set theory, evidence 
theory. 
2.1 Introduction 
Operations in harsh environmental conditions are challenging and pose significant risks to 
people and infrastructures as well as to the environment. The Arctic and sub-Arctic 
regions are considered to have the harshest environmental conditions in the world, due to 
the presence of ice, extreme cold, high winds and unpredictable weather changes. Despite 
the challenging conditions, these regions contain proven reserves of hydrocarbons and 
mineral resources leading to increased interest of the oil and gas and the mining industries 
(Tellier, 2008). The exploration and development of natural resources in these regions 
present significant safety and integrity challenges, which are identified as the lack of 
detail in construction and operation standards, restricted operating conditions due to 
extreme weather including different ice features such as pack ice and icebergs, 
remoteness, human factors and knowledge and data scarcity (Khan et al., 2014). The 
stakeholders need an improved understanding of operational challenges to ensure safe 
operations in such conditions.     
 
A recent drilling project conducted by Statoil Canada Ltd. (Statoil) in the Flemish Pass 
Basin is an example of distant offshore exploration in the harsh Arctic environment. The 
Basin is located approximately 480 kilometres east of St. John’s, Newfoundland and 
Labrador (Figure 2.1). This is the furthest offshore that Statoil has developed a project, 




Canada Ltd., 2016). Additional fuel requirements to cover the long distance from shore 
means less cargo capacity for vessels and helicopters. The long trip distance, poor 
visibility due to the prevalent occurrence of marine fog, particularly in summer and 
spring, and recurrent storms negatively affect the safety and effectiveness of using 
helicopters for logistics operations (Jan-Erik, 2014). Therefore, marine vessels become 
the only mode of transport in such conditions. However, the presence of icebergs (March 
to July) and sea ice (winter and spring) may hamper timely vessel transit. In addition, 
strong winds, snow and freezing rain raise difficulties for on-board vessel operations. A 
formal risk assessment of marine logistics operations is required to consider these 
additional threats so that vessels can perform routine supply as well as successful 
emergency response.    
 
The objective of this work is to develop a methodology for assessing risk and to identify 
critical factors associated with marine logistics operations in remote and ice-covered 
regions. The innovations in this work stem from: i) adapting an advance fault tree to 
overcome the assumption of independence of faults, ii) considering a fuzzy inference 
system to incorporate data uncertainty (vagueness and subjectivity), and iii) considering 
evidence theory to integrate data from multiple sources and incomplete data. The 
proposed unique model will help to analyze risk factors for marine logistics operations in 
quantitative terms. This will also help in developing effective and efficient risk 






Figure 2.1: Location of Statoil exploration drilling project in the Flemish Pass Basin 
(Source: News/ June 10, 2016/Statoil Canada Limited) 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 broadly describes the 
methodology for risk analysis of marine logistics operations and an illustrated example is 
presented in section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses results and conclusions are provided in 
section 2.5. 
2.2 Methodology to Develop Logistics Risk Model 
The aim of this work is to develop a basis for assessing risk for logistics operations in 




challenges. The framework for this study is illustrated in Figure 2.2. The possible factors 
that may affect the successful operation at each stage of a logistics operation are 
identified. A fault tree-based risk model is developed. This model is revised considering 
interdependence of parameters. The risk model is subsequently integrated with fuzzy and 
evidence theory to overcome the uncertainties of failure probability data. These steps are 
elaborated in the following sections. 
 
 





2.2.1 Logical modelling of marine logistics support 
 Identification of Main Contributing Factors 
Logistics operations are conducted to transport personnel and to provide routine supplies 
as well as emergency support to recover from hazardous incidents. The sequence of 
activities involved in the process of an emergency logistics operation is presented in 
Figure 2.3. This process consists of the following phases: departure readiness of a supply 
vessel when an incident has been reported, an uninterrupted voyage, functionality of on-
board equipment, arrival at the site within the desired time limit and on-site operation. A 
successful logistics operation will not be possible if any of these phases fails. The risk 








Failure/delay due to departure readiness 
The ship cannot depart for ER or logistics support if there is insufficient crew, a shortage 
of fuel for the distance, lack of safety equipment, or engine problems. Working in cold 
weather can endanger the crew unless proper preparations are made to equip the vessel 
and the crew for operating in the cold, dark, and icy conditions. Failure due to improper 
voyage plans has been addressed in detail by Kum and Sahin (2015). The vessel should 
be equipped with the following safety features for safe operation: 
 
Lifesaving appliances: Lifeboats should be enclosed, and specially designed to operate in 
cold weather and turbulent water. Launching equipment should be designed to avoid the 
effects of freezing ice. Immersion suits are necessary for crew survival. The reliability 
information about lifesaving appliances is obtained from Bercha et al. (2003). 
 
Firefighting equipment: Significant risks are associated with the use of firefighting 
equipment in extremely low temperatures, the most significant being the potential 
freezing of fluids in lines. Specific risks include: 
 
- Freezing of firefighting equipment such as water hoses, piping, and nozzles. 
- Portable fire extinguisher storage may be obstructed or frozen. 





Navigation equipment: Navigational equipment of a ship includes steering, hydraulic and 
propulsion systems. Faulty equipment may result in departure failure (Antao et al., 2006). 
A modern marine engine has a very complex structure that consists of many mechanical 
components as well as a fuel system, lubricating system, cooling system, auxiliary system 
and a control and safety system.  The reliability features of a vessel engine were described 
in detail by Laskowski (2015); Khorasani (2015).  
Unobstructed voyage 
The main factors that can disrupt the transit of a vessel are environmental factors (wind, 
waves and ice), loss of hull integrity and operational, navigational or communication 
failure. 
 
Environmental factors: The northern regions have extreme climatic conditions that 
include prolonged winters with sub-zero temperatures, the presence of different forms of 
ice features and high wind and waves. Any precipitation in low temperatures results in 
snow, freezing rain or ice pellets that can reduce visibility and cause the accretion of ice 
on ships. Ice movement due to high wind and currents and presence of icebergs can 
impose the risk of ship besetting incidents. The reported ice conditions on ice charts or 
satellite imagery can change frequently, particularly the positions of the ice edge and the 





Loss of hull integrity: Ship hull integrity failure may lead to an unsuccessful operation. 
This failure can occur due to causes such as collision with an iceberg, human error or 
operational failure. 
 
Navigational and operational Failure: Navigational failure may occur for many reasons 
that include radar failure, control error, propulsion system failure, human error, and 
difficulties arising from prevailing weather conditions such as poor visibility. 
Probabilistic assessment of a ship’s navigational failure was presented by Pietrzykowski 
(2007); Amrozowicz et al. (1997). The operational safety features of vessels operating in 
polar waters have been described in IMO (2010). The presence of various forms of ice 
and harsh climatic conditions impose additional operational risk to vessels operating in 
the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions. Navigational and operational failure probabilities were 
presented in Afenyo et al., 2017.  
 Equipment functionality failure 
The equipment may not be fully functional during the ER operation because of 
mechanical failure, lack of maintenance or human error. 
 
Human error: According to Senders & Moray (1991), human error is a result of 
observable behaviour originating from psychological processes on different levels. It is 
evaluated against some performance standards, initiated by an event in a situation where 





- Evaluation of human behaviour against a performance standard or criterion. 
- An event which results the measurable performance is not achieved; e.g. the expected 
level is not met by the acting agent. 
- A degree of volition such that the actor has the opportunity to act in a way that will 
not be considered erroneous. 
Promptness  
The response time is very important for a successful operation. A complete operation 
could be considered a failure if the vessel does not arrive on time.  
On-board fire/emergency response failure 
On-site weather conditions and humans also play important roles in this case. The on-
board operation may fail due to lack of manpower, absence of personal protective 
equipment or obstruction of the hazard’s location. 
 Probabilistic Logistics Risk Model  
A fault tree (FT) is a quantitative risk analysis tool; a system or component failure is 
graphically presented as logical relationships with possible causes that can contribute to 
the system or component failure (Andrews and Moss, 2002). A system failure is referred 
to as a “top event” and all primary causes are defined as basic events, which are 
connected by logic gates in the FT. Basic events have binary states, i.e., success/failure, 
and are considered as mutually independent (Khakzad et al., 2011). There are several 
logic gates; however, the AND-gate and OR-gate are mostly used in the FT. A fault tree 
is adapted to its top event that includes only the most credible faults as assessed by the 





The emergency response process has been defined and the contributing factors are 
identified in the previous sections; a simple FT model is developed and presented in parts 
from Figures 2.4 to 2.7. The top event is emergency response (ER) failure, which is 
connected by an OR-gate with vessel readiness, unobstructed voyage, functionality of 
equipment, promptness and on-board operation, as failure of any of these events can 
cause top event failure. These intermediate events are further broken down to lower 
resolution events until primary causes are encountered. Promptness is considered as a 
basic event that has not been developed further in this study. Some of the basic events, 
e.g., human error or environmental causes, may affect different phases of the logistics 
operation, which have been considered in the FT model.   
 
After constructing a fault tree, its outcomes can be analyzed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. In quantitative analysis, the top event failure probability is calculated based 
on the failure probabilities of the basic events using Boolean algebra (Crowl and Louvar, 
2002). Quantitative results are used for identifying quantitative rankings of contributions 
to system failure and the evaluation of model and data sensitivity (Vesely et al., 1981). In 
this study, the top event probability is calculated using quantitative analysis and the 
results are verified with the analysis conducted by the “Fault Tree +” software (Ferdous et 
al., 2007). The sensitivity analysis is performed to identify the critical factors and is 
presented in section 2.4. In qualitative analysis, minimal cut sets (MCS) are used for 




associated with the top event. A minimal cut set is a set of a minimum number of primary 
events that produces the top event if and only if all the events of the set occur.  Since all 
the basic events in the primary FT model are connected by an OR-gate, failure of any 
basic event can lead to the top event failure, which means the total number of MCS will 
be equal to the number of basic events. Therefore, similar results can be obtained through 
the MCS approach and are not presented here.   
 
 






Figure 2.5: Fault Tree model for unobstructed voyage failure 
 
 






Figure 2.7: Fault Tree model for on-site operational failure 
 
2.2.2 Adaption of advanced probabilistic approach to develop risk model 
Although fault tree analysis (FTA) is a useful risk assessment technique, it suffers from 
some limitations such as the assumptions of mutually independent basic events and 
exclusively binary states of events. In addition, the traditional FTA cannot incorporate 
uncertainties in data. Several studies presented the fuzzy set theory (Mamood et al., 2013; 
Lavasani et al., 2011; Ferdous et al., 2009, Pan and Yun, 1997; Tanaka et al., 1983), the 




and Wang, 1997) to deal with data uncertainty in FTA. In this study, the two main 
categories of uncertainty, namely, model uncertainty and data uncertainty, are considered. 
 
The FT model is constructed based on several assumptions, which are summarized in 
Table 2.1. The identified approaches that can be adapted to relax the assumptions are: (1) 
use of the Inhibit gate to overcome independencies, and leaky AND/OR, noisy-OR/AND 
logic to overcome the binary nature and (2) use of a Bayesian network (BN) – that 
provides the flexibility of interdependence and addresses model/data uncertainty. In this 
paper, a case study has been presented to show how the simplified OR-gate is replaced by 
the Inhibit gate in the FT to address dependencies. 
 
Table 2.1: Model assumptions in the traditional FT model and approaches to relax the 
assumptions 
 
Model Assumptions Approach to Relax Assumptions Reference 
1 
Traditional FT is static in nature and 
does not handle uncertainty. It does 
not offer the incorporation of newly 
available probability information 
into the model. 
Bayesian network (BN) approach can 





It is assumed that all primary or 
basic events are independent. 
Dependencies among primary events 
can be address by advanced logic gates 
e.g. Inhibit gate, or BN approach.  
Andrews 
and Moss, 
2002                                 
3 
Simplified OR-gates are used, which 
means that failure of any primary 
event will lead to a complete ER or 
logistics operation failure. Under this 
assumption, the failure probability 
estimation would be very 
conservative. 
 
Inhibit gate or Noisy-OR gate may be 












Table 2.1: Model assumptions in the traditional FT model and approaches to relax the 
assumptions (continued) 
 Model Assumptions Approach to Relax Assumptions Reference 
4 
All events are assumed to possess a 
binary state (success/failure or 
working/not working). 
Probabilistic gates such as noisy gate 
and gate with leak can be introduced 
that give the flexibility to choose an 
intermediate state of an event between 
1 and 0 unlike AND/OR gates. In this 
way, the estimation of top event 







Environmental conditions such as 
wind, wave, or ice conditions are 
assumed to be independent and not 
region and time specific. In reality, 
these are significantly related. The 
dynamics of sea ice is governed by 
several driving forces such as wind, 
waves, internal ice stress divergence, 
Coriolis force, and sea surface tilt. 
Inhibit gates may be considered in the 
FT model to address dependencies or 
conditional dependencies. Site specific 
and seasonal probability data should be 
used if available. 





Intermediate events (A1 – A5) are 
placed in series to represent the 
process. It is assumed that the failure 
of any of these events will cause ER 
failure. 
These events could be non-sequential 
and may have complex 
interdependencies. For example, 
dysfunctionality of marine equipment 
may happen at any stage of this 
operation which could affect timely 
departure of the vessel, unobstructed 
voyage and onboard operation. It may 
need a different approach and 
technique such as BN to develop the 




Promptness (A4): the response time 
is a very important factor for the 
success of logistics operations. A 
complete operation could be 
considered a failure if the vessel is 
unable to arrive on time. In the FT 
model, this event is considered as 
two states: success or failure. 
However, the model should be 
developed so that it can be expressed 
in time, which will determine if the 
operation is either a failure or 
success.  
BN model with multistate variables for 
response time during logistics 
operation can be developed to address 
this issue. Moreover, response time is 
dependent on vessel specifications, 
distance to the production facility, 
regional weather conditions etc. These 
factors are not considered in the 
existing model. At this moment, it is 
considered as an undeveloped event as 
more detail analysis is required with 








Table 2.1: Model assumptions in the traditional FT model and approaches to relax the 
assumptions (continued) 
 Model Assumptions Approach to Relax Assumptions Reference 
8 
Loss of hull integrity (A2.4) is 
considered as an independent 
primary event, which in fact depends 
on many factors such as 
environmental (wind, waves, current, 
ice), operational failure etc. 
Conditional dependencies among these 




Crew availability (A1.2) has two 
states: yes/no. 
 
It should be defined by two features: 
(a) adequate numbers of crew and (b) 




There are many factors that may lead 
to engine issues (A1.4). However, 
the details are not considered in this 
study. 
Engine failure may occur due to 
several reasons and the corresponding 
data of engine failures is not currently 
available. This assumption can be 
relaxed when more internal details of 
design and operational characteristics 
of marine engines become available.  
 
11 
The FT model has the limitation of 
integrating subjective and imprecise 
events such as human error in failure 
logic model.  
Fuzzy-based FTA or evidence-based 
FTA approach can be adopted for 
overcoming these limitations. 
Mahmood 







During on-board operation, it is 
assumed that all personnel are fit and 
equally skilled to conduct the 
operation. 
Defined personnel states can be 
characterised in the model using BN. 
 
 
Initially, environmental conditions such as wind, wave and ice conditions are assumed to 
be independent. However, incidents of sea ice and pack pressured ice occur when sea ice 
fields converge due to local wind, wave, and current conditions, as well as boundary 
conditions imposed by the local coastline geometry in near shore cases. These events can 
have serious implications for marine transport operations in ice-prone environments, as 




endanger personnel safety. Therefore, the combined effects of wind, wave and ice 
conditions should be considered in the study rather than treating those as separate 
independent events. Inhibit gates have been introduced to represent their dependencies. 
This study represents a scenario in which the ice conditions are dependent on the 
additional conditional events, wind and wave conditions. More details about the Inhibit 
gate are described by Andrews and Moss (2002). The modified FT has been presented in 
Figures 2.8 to 2.10.  
 
 






Figure 2.9: Modified Fault Tree model for unobstructed voyage failure 
 
 




2.2.3 Data Uncertainty 
Table 2.2 summarizes the data related assumptions that may result in uncertainty in risk 
assessment. In the advance FTA, a fuzzy-based approach is adopted to the address 
vagueness and subjectivity of failure probability data, and evidence theory is applied to 
address incomplete and missing data as well as incorporating different experts’ opinion in 
the analysis. 
 
Table 2.2: Data assumptions in marine logistics risk analysis 
 
Data Assumptions Approach to Relax Assumptions Reference 
1 
The failure probability 
data used in this study is 
for a specific period time. 
Fuzzy theory can be employed to 
address this type of data limitation.    
 
2 
For some events such as 
site clearance, PPE etc., 
historical failure rate data 
are not available. Hence, 
failure rate is assumed 
based on expert opinion. 
Evidence theory can be introduced to 
deal with this issue. In addition, this 
approach enables the integration of 
different expert opinions. 
                                                             
BN approach gives the flexibility to use 
data elicitation from experts. 
Lavasani et al., 2011 





 Vagueness and Subjectivity of Data 
The theory of Fuzzy sets was first introduced by Zadeh (1965). It provides a unique way 
to address vagueness and data uncertainty. In traditional FTA, system failure is evaluated 
based on the exact value of failure probabilities of the basic events. However, it is 
difficult to estimate a precise failure rate or the probability of components failure due to 
lack of sufficient data or the vague character of the events (Mahmood et al., 2013). 
Fuzzy-based approaches effectively deal with imprecision that arises due to 
subjectivity/vagueness, which can be useful in risk assessment to handle these types of 
uncertainties (Ferdous et al., 2009).  
 
The fuzzy set of an event contains fuzzy numbers that have varying degrees of 
membership function (μ) ranging from 0 to 1. The relationship between the event 
probability and a membership function is represented by a fuzzy set. The degree of 
membership of element x in the fuzzy set of an event p is mathematically represented as 
(Ross, 2004): 
 
μp(x) ∈ [0, 1] 
 
Fuzzy numbers can be of any form; however, triangular or trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are 
commonly used in reliability and risk assessments. A triangular fuzzy number (TFN) is 




2.11 illustrates a TFN and the fuzzy intervals are obtained using the following equation 
2.1 (Ferdous et al., 2011; Pan and Yun, 1997): 
 
            pα = [pl + α(pm – pl), pu – α(pu – pm)]              (2.1)  
 
where pl, pm, and pu represent minimum, most likely, and upper values, respectively, in 
the 𝛼- cut level. 
 
Figure 2.11: Representation of triangular fuzzy number of an event 
 
The fuzzy-based FTA involves the following steps: (1) Generation of fuzzy probabilities 
of basic events TFN at various 𝛼- cut levels, (2) Estimation of fuzzified top event failure 
probabilities based on Table 2.3, and (3) Defuzzification of top event failure probability 







Table 2.3: Arithmetic expressions for fuzzy FTA 
Gate type                         𝛼- cut formulation 
OR-gate 𝑝𝑙
𝛼

















There are several methods for the defuzzification process, such as the centre of area 
method, centre of maxima method, mean of maxima method, and weighted average 
defuzzify method. For this problem, top event fuzzy failure probability sets are 
defuzzified using the centre of maxima method (Klir and Yuan, 1995). 
 Incomplete Data and Conflict Between Expert Opinion 
Evidence theory was first proposed by Dempster (1966) and later extended by Shafer 
(1976), which is also known as the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). Missing data and 
conflicting subjective data can be addressed by evidence theory. This helps in many 
ways, such as integrating data from different sources, filling missing data sources, 
resolving the issue of varying data for the same cause/event, and updating the probability 
when new information becomes available.  
 
According to DST, an event probability is defined with a set of lower and upper bound 
values, which are denoted as belief and plausibility, respectively, and a mass is assigned 




elaborately described by Ferdous et al. (2009 & 2011). The following steps are involved 
in evidence-based FTA:  
 
(1) Defining the frame of discernment (FOD). In this study, FOD Ω = {F, S}, 
where F and S indicate failure and success, respectively. The power set 
includes four subsets: {Φ, {F}, {S}, {F, S}} and cardinality; |Ω| is two. 
(2) Assigning basic probability and ignorance of each basic event based on 
literature and expert opinions. 
(3) Combining the individual beliefs of experts if there are more than one and 
generating a joint belief structure. 
(4) Estimating belief and bet of the basic events and the top events. 
2.3 Application of the Proposed Model 
In this study, the failure probabilities of each basic event are obtained either from the 
literature or from expert opinions. The failure probabilities of the basic events and 











Table 2.4: Failure probabilities of basic events 




Failure of departure 
readiness (A1) 
Fuel availability (A1.1) 3.97 × 10−4 Kum and Sahin (2015) 
Crew availability (A1.2) 3.97 × 10−4 Kum and Sahin (2015) 
Lifesaving appliances (A1.3.1) 1.00 × 10−3 Bercha et al. 2003 
Firefighting equipment (A1.3.2) 3.97 × 10−4 Kum and Sahin (2015) 
Navigation equipment (A1.3.3) 2.55 × 10−3 Antao et al. 2006 




Wind conditions (A2.1) 6.00 × 10−3 Afenyo et al. 2017 
Wave conditions (A2.2) 1.97 × 10−4 Kose et al. 1997 
Sea ice (A2.3.1) 2.75 × 10−3 Kum and Sahin (2015) 
Pressured ice (A2.3.2) 5.94 × 10−2 Kum and Sahin (2015) 
Iceberg (A2.3.3) 1.00 × 10−2 Afenyo et al. 2017 
Loss of hull integrity (A2.4) 1.33 × 10−4 Christou et al. 2012 
Operational system failure (A2.5.1) 1.00 × 10−4 Afenyo et al. 2017 
Navigational failure (A2.5.2) 2.00 × 10−6 Afenyo et al. 2017 




Human error (A3.1) 3.00 × 10−4 Afenyo et al. 2017 
Maintenance failure (A3.2) 1.00 × 10−4 Expert opinion 
Mechanical failure (A3.3) 1.00 × 10−5 Afenyo et al. 2017 
Safety equipment maintenance 
(A3.4) 
1.00 × 10−3 Expert opinion 





Wind conditions (A5.1.1) 6.00 × 10−3 Afenyo et al. 2017 
Wave conditions (A5.1.2) 1.97 × 10−4 Kose et al. 1997 
Marine icing (A5.1.3) 1.50 × 10−4 Expert opinion 
Human error (miscommunication) 
(A5.2.1) 
1.00 × 10−4 Afenyo et al. 2017 
Mechanical failure (A5.2.2.1) 5.46 × 10−2 Bercha et al. 2003 
Software/control system failure 
(A5.2.2.2) 
4.00 × 10−4 Afenyo et al. 2017 
PPE (A5.3) 5.00 × 10−3 Expert opinion 
Manpower (A5.4) 1.00 × 10−2 Expert opinion 
Site Clearance (A5.5) 1.00 × 10−3 Expert opinion 
 
The top event failure probability is estimated for both the traditional and advanced fault 




FTA is 0.1534, which can be interpreted as indicating that the chance of emergency 
response (ER) failure is about 1 in every 7 operations. This seems very conservative. In 
contrast, the estimated failure probability decreases to nearly half, which means the 
chance of failure becomes 1 in every 13 operations when the Inhibit gates are used. An 
Inhibit gate logically represents an AND-gate with an external conditional event. 
Therefore, the replacement of OR-gates with Inhibit gates considerably reduces the top 
event failure probability. Probability data related to the exact type of scenarios are not 
publicly available. However, based on Lloyd’s worldwide data for 1994-97, the failure 
rate of cargo ships is 3.1 × 10−4 each year, which gives the probability of failure as 1 in 18 
voyages, assuming two days per voyage (IAEA report, 2001).   
2.3.1 Application of fuzzy theory 
In this study, a triangular fuzzy approach is adopted, where failure probabilities collected 
from the literature are considered as the most likely values of basic events. Reasonable 
lower and upper boundaries have been set to form the fuzzy triangle for each event. The 
projected failure probabilities of basic events are obtained from the corresponding fuzzy 
triangles for different α - cut levels. An example is provided in Table 2.5, where the 









Table 2.5: Triangular Fuzzy Number at α=0.95 



















Fuel availability (A1.1) 3.97E-04 1.99E-04 3.97E-04 7.94E-04 3.87E-04 4.17E-04 
Crew availability (A1.2) 3.97E-04 1.99E-04 3.97E-04 7.94E-04 3.87E-04 4.17E-04 
Lifesaving appliances (A1.3.1) 1.00E-03 5.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 9.75E-04 1.05E-03 
Firefighting equipment (A1.3.2) 3.97E-04 1.99E-04 3.97E-04 7.94E-04 3.87E-04 4.17E-04 
Navigation equipment (A1.3.3) 2.55E-03 1.28E-03 2.55E-03 5.10E-03 2.49E-03 2.68E-03 
Engine issues (A1.4) 2.60E-04 1.30E-04 2.60E-04 5.20E-04 2.54E-04 2.73E-04 
Wind conditions (A2.1) 6.00E-03 3.00E-03 6.00E-03 1.20E-02 5.85E-03 6.30E-03 
Wave conditions (A2.2) 1.97E-04 9.85E-05 1.97E-04 3.94E-04 1.92E-04 2.07E-04 
Sea ice (A2.3.1) 2.75E-03 1.38E-03 2.75E-03 5.50E-03 2.68E-03 2.89E-03 
Pressured ice (A2.3.2) 5.94E-02 2.97E-02 5.94E-02 1.19E-01 5.79E-02 6.24E-02 
Iceberg (A2.3.3) 1.00E-02 5.00E-03 1.00E-02 2.00E-02 9.75E-03 1.05E-02 
Loss of hull integrity (A2.4) 1.33E-04 6.65E-05 1.33E-04 2.66E-04 1.30E-04 1.40E-04 
Operational system failure (A2.5.1) 1.00E-04 5.00E-05 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 9.75E-05 1.05E-04 
Navigational failure (A2.5.2) 2.00E-06 1.00E-06 2.00E-06 4.00E-06 1.95E-06 2.10E-06 
Communication failure (A2.5.3) 5.50E-04 2.75E-04 5.50E-04 1.10E-03 5.36E-04 5.78E-04 
Human error (A3.1) 3.00E-04 1.50E-04 3.00E-04 6.00E-04 2.93E-04 3.15E-04 
Maintenance failure (A3.2) 1.00E-04 5.00E-05 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 9.75E-05 1.05E-04 
Mechanical failure (A3.3) 1.00E-05 5.00E-06 1.00E-05 2.00E-05 9.75E-06 1.05E-05 
Safety equipment maintenance (A3.4) 1.00E-03 5.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 9.75E-04 1.05E-03 
Promptness (A4) --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Wind conditions (A5.1.1) 6.00E-03 3.00E-03 6.00E-03 1.20E-02 5.85E-03 6.30E-03 
Wave conditions (A5.1.2) 1.97E-04 9.85E-05 1.97E-04 3.94E-04 1.92E-04 2.07E-04 
Marine icing (A5.1.3) 1.50E-04 7.50E-05 1.50E-04 3.00E-04 1.46E-04 1.58E-04 
Human error (miscommunication) 
(A5.2.1) 1.00E-04 5.00E-05 1.00E-04 2.00E-04 9.75E-05 1.05E-04 
Mechanical failure (A5.2.2.1) 5.46E-02 2.73E-02 5.46E-02 1.09E-01 5.32E-02 5.73E-02 
Software/control system failure 
(A5.2.2.2) 4.00E-04 2.00E-04 4.00E-04 8.00E-04 3.90E-04 4.20E-04 
PPE (A5.3) 5.00E-03 2.50E-03 5.00E-03 1.00E-02 4.88E-03 5.25E-03 
Manpower (A5.4) 1.00E-02 5.00E-03 1.00E-02 2.00E-02 9.75E-03 1.05E-02 
Site Clearance (A5.5) 1.00E-03 5.00E-04 1.00E-03 2.00E-03 9.75E-04 1.05E-03 




Fuzzified top event failure probabilities are estimated for each confidence interval and 
then defuzzified to crisp probability using the centre of maxima method. A comparison of 
the results is presented in Table 2.6. 
  
Table 2.6: Error robustness of fuzzy approach 
Considered Error in Data   Crisp Value Deviation in Percentage 
5% 0.0778 1.24 
10% 0.0787 2.41 
15% 0.0796 3.65 
No Error      0.0768 0 
 
2.3.2 Application of evidence theory 
Evidence theory is used to consider incomplete data and integration of data from multiple 
sources. To illustrate the application of the theory to the proposed model, data from two 
different experts are used. Both experts have doctoral degrees, have conducted several 
offshore safety related projects and have more than five years of experience in the 









Table 2.7: Basic probability assignments 
Basic Event 






{F} Success {S} {SF} 
Fuel availability (A1.1) 3.61E-04 9.31E-01 0.069 4.37E-04 9.93E-01 0.0069 
Crew availability (A1.2) 3.61E-04 9.31E-01 0.069 5.96E-04 9.93E-01 0.0069 
Lifesaving appliances (A1.3.1) 9.09E-04 9.24E-01 0.075 1.50E-03 9.91E-01 0.0075 
Firefighting equipment (A1.3.2) 3.61E-04 9.31E-01 0.069 5.96E-04 9.93E-01 0.0069 
Navigation equipment (A1.3.3) 2.32E-03 9.28E-01 0.07 3.83E-03 9.89E-01 0.007 
Engine issues (A1.4) 2.36E-04 9.30E-01 0.07 3.90E-04 9.93E-01 0.007 
Wind conditions (A2.1) 5.45E-03 9.20E-01 0.075 9.00E-03 9.84E-01 0.0075 
Wave conditions (A2.2) 1.79E-04 9.25E-01 0.075 2.96E-04 9.92E-01 0.0075 
Sea ice (A2.3.1) 2.50E-03 9.23E-01 0.075 4.13E-03 9.88E-01 0.0075 
Pressured ice (A2.3.2) 5.40E-02 8.71E-01 0.075 8.91E-02 9.03E-01 0.0075 
Iceberg (A2.3.3) 9.09E-03 9.21E-01 0.07 1.50E-02 9.78E-01 0.007 
Loss of hull integrity (A2.4) 1.21E-04 9.35E-01 0.065 2.00E-04 9.93E-01 0.0065 
Operational system failure (A2.5.1) 9.09E-05 9.30E-01 0.07 1.50E-04 9.93E-01 0.007 
Navigational failure (A2.5.2) 1.82E-06 9.32E-01 0.068 3.00E-06 9.93E-01 0.0068 
Communication failure (A2.5.3) 5.00E-04 9.32E-01 0.068 8.25E-04 9.92E-01 0.0068 
Human error (A3.1) 2.73E-04 9.25E-01 0.075 4.50E-04 9.92E-01 0.0075 
Maintenance failure (A3.2) 9.09E-05 9.30E-01 0.07 1.50E-04 9.93E-01 0.007 
Mechanical failure (A3.3) 9.09E-06 9.25E-01 0.075 1.50E-05 9.92E-01 0.0075 
Safety equipment maintenance 
(A3.4) 9.09E-04 9.29E-01 0.07 1.50E-03 9.92E-01 0.007 
Promptness (A4) 0.00E+00 9.30E-01 0.07 0.00E+00 9.93E-01 0.007 
Wind conditions (A5.1.1) 5.45E-03 9.20E-01 0.075 9.00E-03 9.84E-01 0.0075 
Wave conditions (A5.1.2) 1.79E-04 9.25E-01 0.075 2.96E-04 9.92E-01 0.0075 
Marine icing (A5.1.3) 1.36E-04 9.25E-01 0.075 2.25E-04 9.92E-01 0.0075 
Human error (miscommunication) 
(A5.2.1) 9.09E-05 9.25E-01 0.075 1.50E-04 9.92E-01 0.0075 
Mechanical failure (A5.2.2.1) 4.96E-02 8.75E-01 0.075 8.19E-02 9.11E-01 0.0075 
Software/control system failure 
(A5.2.2.2) 3.64E-04 9.30E-01 0.07 6.00E-04 9.92E-01 0.007 
PPE (A5.3) 4.55E-03 9.30E-01 0.065 7.50E-03 9.86E-01 0.0065 
Manpower (A5.4) 9.09E-03 9.23E-01 0.068 1.50E-02 9.78E-01 0.0068 





Two different sets of data have been used to formulate evidence theory in the FTA, which 
are combined using both DST and Yager rules. The combination rules are described in 
Ferdous et al., 2011; Smarandache and Dezert, 2004; Yager, 1987. A sample calculation 
is presented in Table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8: Combination of beliefs 
Fuel availability (A1.1) 
  
F = Failure S = Success FS 
  
3.61E-04 3.61E-04 6.90E-02 
F 4.37E-04 1.58E-07 1.58E-07 3.01E-05 
S 9.93E-01 3.58E-04 3.58E-04 6.85E-02 





3.28E-05 6.89E-02 4.76E-04 
     DS 
 
3.28E-05 6.89E-02 4.76E-04 
Yager 
 
3.28E-05 6.89E-02 8.35E-04 
     
 
Bel (F) Pl (F) Bel (S) Pl (S) 
DS 3.28E-05 5.09E-04 6.89E-02 6.94E-02 
Yager 3.28E-05 8.67E-04 6.89E-02 6.97E-02 
 
Three important characteristics, namely, belief, plausible value and Bet of the top event 





Table 2.9: Belief structures and "Bet" estimation of the top event 
Belief structures and "Bet"  
DS rule Yager rule 
Bel Pl Bet Bel Pl Bet 
0.0203 0.1221 0.0712 0.0132 0.1814 0.0973 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The failure probability of logistics operations is estimated using traditional FTA, 
advanced fuzzy-based FTA and evidence-theory-based FTA. The summary of results is 
provided in Table 2.10. 
 
Table 2.10: Top event failure probability based on different approach 
Traditional FTA Advanced FTA 
Fuzzy-based FTA Evidence-theory-based FTA 
with 10% uncertainty DS rule Yager rule 
0.1534 0.0768 0.0787 0.0712 0.0973 
 
The traditional FTA gives significantly higher failure probability, as the construction of 
the FT model is overly simplified with OR-gates only, where factor dependencies and 
data uncertainties are not considered. In the advanced FTA, a non-traditional gate such as 
the Inhibit gate is introduced, which provides a less conservative probability estimate. 
The use of fuzzy theory in the advanced FTA offers a better decision-making approach 




seems relatively high. The outcome mainly depends on how the ignorance of probability 
data is set by different experts, based on the expert’s knowledge. Also, evidence theory 
has the advantage that multi-source data can be integrated with the analysis and the model 
can be updated in the light of new information.  
 
The analysis presented in this study demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed 
framework to assess risk in logistics operations. It is therefore important to rank the 
critical factors, where preference should be given to improving the reliability of the 
operations. The improvement indices are used to identify the most critical basic events 
that lead to operational failure. The improvement index of an event is calculated by 
eliminating this event from the fault tree, to measure the reduction of the magnitude of 
top event failure probability (Ferdous et al., 2009; Tanaka et al., 1983; Misra and Weber, 
1990). The following equation 2.2 is used to evaluate this index: 
 
                       FIM(PT, PTi) = (Pil(T) − Pil(Ti )) + (Piu(T) − Piu(Ti ))                                         (2.2) 
 
where PT and PTi refer to top event failure probability without and with an eliminated 
basic event, respectively. Subscripts l and u indicate the lower and upper bound of fuzzy 
numbers. 
 
The high ratio of improvement indices and ER failure probability of the basic events are 




manpower, absence of suitable personal protective equipment, failure of navigation 
equipment and inadequate or missing lifesaving appliances are the most contributory 
factors that lead to ER failure. Mechanical failure includes a broad range of equipment 
failure during an on-board operation and the failure probability is significantly influenced 
by the weather conditions (Bercha, 2003). The correlations among mechanical failure, 
human error and existing environmental conditions are not considered in the FTA. 
Detailed investigation is required to improve the reliability assessment, which could be an 
area of future work. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Ratio of Improvement Index and ER failure probability of basic events (See 





This paper presents a risk model to analyze operational challenges of marine logistics 
support in harsh environmental conditions. The objective of this study is to identify the 
critical factors that will provide guidance to identify risk reduction measures to achieve a 
safer and faster approach in responding to this type of operation. For example, one such 
measure is the temporary offshore refuge, which needs to be further investigated. This 
work provides a basis for developing solutions to emergency marine logistics problems in 
remote and harsh regions. 
 
Fault trees are used as a tool to develop the risk model. Application of the proposed FT 
model is demonstrated by studying an emergency response scenario. Although the fault 
tree is a common technique for assessing operational performance and reliability of a 
system, the traditional fault tree suffers from several limitations. Addressing 
interdependencies of events, adapting to new information and knowledge and handling 
uncertainties are of fundamental importance for a robust risk model. This study addresses 
these points through: 
 
(1) Consideration of interdependencies of events in the fault tree model through non-
traditional gates such as the Inhibit gate. 
(2) Consideration of data uncertainty in the earlier belief or data, which is important, as 




helps to enhance robustness of the analysis in the presence of vague and subjective 
data. 
(3) Consideration of missing data and conflicting subjective data using evidence theory. 
This consideration helps to integrate data from different sources, overcome a missing 
data problem, resolve the issue when there is varying data for the same event and 
update the probability. 
 
The sensitivity analysis results reveal that the most critical phase of this process is 
conducting a successful on-board operation after reaching the target location. The main 
challenges include, but are not limited to, mechanical failure that comprises malfunction 
of lifeboats, failure to launch, inability to reach the installation due to severe ice 
conditions etc., and lack of trained and experienced personnel to conduct the operation in 
such harsh environmental conditions. The study presents a generic model, which may be 
used to conduct a marine logistics risk assessment and support an operation in a harsh 
offshore environment. The proposed model can be modified based on region-specific 
features and analysis should be performed using suitable probability data available for 
that region. Feedback from two experts with similar education and experience levels are 
considered in this study. More data from experts with diverse backgrounds such as 
academicians, ships’ captains, and other offshore personnel can be incorporated when 
available. A weighting factor can be introduced based on the profession and experience of 
the experts. In addition, further investigation is required to develop “Promptness”. 




of response time, can be proposed as future work. The use of the advance FTA is a useful 
tool to model risk for ER processes, although an alternative modelling approach, namely, 
the BN, has a more flexible structure than the fault tree and offers better representation of 
interdependencies and uncertainty handling capacity. Therefore, BN modelling of the ER 
operation could be a promising future study. 
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Industries and researchers have renewed interest in the Arctic as well as the sub-Arctic 
regions due to the proven hydrocarbon reserves. The main challenges of operations in 
these regions arise due to their remoteness and extreme weather conditions. These 
conditions also put major challenges to plan emergency logistics support, which is 
currently offered either by helicopters or marine vessels. This paper analyzes the risk-
based marine logistics support model in an offshore facility operating in the far northern 
(sub-arctic) region. A Bayesian network (BN) approach is used to develop the risk model 
considering interdependencies and conditional relationships among the contributing 
factors. Exploration in the Flemish pass basin located offshore Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Canada, is selected as a case study to demonstrate the methodology. The study 
identifies the critical elements of a marine logistics operation that need attention to reduce 
its associated risk. The corresponding safety measures are identified and implemented 
into the risk model. Appropriate risk management strategies are proposed to support 
marine logistics operations.  
Keywords: Marine logistics, offshore risk management, fault tree, Bayesian network. 
3.1 Methodology to Develop Logistics Risk Model 
Harsh environments represent extreme weather conditions, which are not favorable for 
human, infrastructure and habitat (Khan et al., 2014a). The northern frontiers have the 
harshest environmental conditions with the presence of various ice features, extreme cold 
temperature, freezing rain, high wind and wave, and marine fog (Walsh, 2008; Arctic 




resources in these regions face significant safety and integrity challenges, which are 
identified as the lack of details in construction and operation standards, restricted 
operating conditions, presence of different ice features such as pack ice and icebergs, 
remoteness, human factors, and knowledge and data scarcity (Khan et al., 2014b). There 
are several standards and practices such as ABS 2010, ISO 19906:2010, NORSOK S-002, 
Barents 2020 available for the operation in harsh environments. However, there is a lack 
of design and operational guidelines for further north that must consider the additional 
distance and more extreme environmental conditions (Hamilton, 2011; Meling, 2013). 
The planning and procedure for logistics supply and support during emergency is an 
important area of research to ensure safe operation, which is the focus of this study. There 
is a need to assess the risk, improve understanding and knowledge as well as develop new 
strategies and technologies prior to launching operations in these regions (Milaković et 
al., 2014; Malykhanov and Chernenko, 2015; Borch, 2018; Uthaug, 2018).     
 
Logistics for offshore operations are provided by supply vessels and helicopters. In 
general, marine vessels are used for transporting materials and supplies from an onshore 
supply base to support offshore exploration activities. Helicopters are used to transport 
personnel and light cargo to and from offshore platforms. Besides the routine logistics for 
supply, the role of emergency response (ER) is to support emergency evacuation when 
the platform needs to be abandoned. In addition, the ER team needs to reach the platform 
to restore its production during a disturbance or perturbation. Prompt response is required 




which can be critical due to the distance and environments. Faster response can be 
provided by helicopter than support vessel, however the use of helicopter is limited when 
the distance is too long, and subject to weather conditions. Also, it cannot be used if the 
platform itself is sinking or any situation that is not safe for the helicopter to land or 
winch. The accident rates in the offshore helicopter industry are still at least one order of 
magnitude greater than those of commercial fixed-wing operations (Oil & Gas UK, 2017; 
OGP, 2010). The crash of a helicopter is almost always considered as a very serious event 
- often leading to fatalities and serious economic loss (Sutton, 2014; Okstad et al., 2012; 
Olsen and Lindøe, 2009; Hokstad et al., 2001; Vinnem, 2011, 2010). Baker et al. (2011) 
published an article about helicopter crashes related to oil and gas operations in the Gulf 
of Mexico, where an average of 6.6 crashes occurred per year during 1983 – 2009 and 
resulted in a total of 139 fatalities. During that period, bad weather led to a total of 29 
crashes, which accounted to 40% of the 139 deaths. According to the Civil Aviation 
Authority and Oil & Gas UK records, there were 73 UK Continental Shelf offshore 
commercial air transport (CAT) accidents reported from 1976 to 2013 in which a total of 
119 fatalities occurred. 11% of these accidents occurred due to external factors such as 
icing, turbulence, wind shear, thunderstorm or bird strike. These problems are particularly 
acute at night, when the accident rates are considerably higher than that in the daytime. 
Knowledge of the hazards and risks associated with such accidents is very limited (Ross 
and Gibb, 2008). This is aggravated by the expected increase in nighttime offshore 
helicopter activities associated with, for example, the beginning of the exploration of oil 




transporting logistics if these circumstances are considered. The feasibility of marine 
logistics operation in the remote harsh environment is not well-understood and needs to 
be further studied (Khan et al., 2014a, 2014b). 
 
In a previous work (Rahman et al., 2019), a failure model of marine logistics operation 
was developed using the fault tree where the inherent limitations of the model and 
available data were identified. An attempt has been made to address the model limitations 
using advanced fault tree analysis using unconventional logical gates.  Researchers have 
adopted the fuzzy theory and the evidence theory to address the data limitations (Zadeh, 
1965; Ferdous et al., 2009, 2011; Klir and Yuan, 2001; Yager, 1987). The current work 
presents a Bayesian approach to address model dependencies. Although fault tree is 
useful for initial stage of model development, the Bayesian approach benefits from 
several advantages over fault tree (Bobbio et al., 2001; Simon et al., 2007). BN has a 
more flexible framework that can address conditional dependencies among the 
contributing factors. It allows backward analysis and probability updating which means 
the updated information can be incorporated to the model (Boudali, 2005; Weber, 2010). 
This feature helps to make the model dynamic and more realistic (Khakzad et al., 2011, 
Yuan et al., 2015). Detail discussion about this is presented in the methodology. The goal 
of this work is to establish risk management strategies for marine logistics operation, 





The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 broadly describes the 
methodology for risk management of marine logistics operations. A case study is 
presented in section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the possible safety measures to reduce risk 
and their application to the model. Conclusions are provided in section 3.5.  
3.2 Methodology 
Risk assessment is a systematic approach that helps in the decision-making process for an 
operation (ABS, 2010). It has two elements, frequency assessment and consequence 
assessment, which can be evaluated either qualitatively or quantitatively. Various 
methods and tools are available for assessing risk, however choosing the right approach is 
a key for useful risk assessment (Crowl and Louvar, 2002; Andrew and Moss, 2002; 
Modaress, 2006). A Bayesian approach is used for modelling marine logistics support risk 
in this study. Bayesian network is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) that satisfies the 
Markovian condition. A DAG is a directed graph with no cycles and the Markovian 
condition for a Bayesian network states that every node in a Bayesian network 
is conditionally independent of its non-descendants, given its parents. A DAG consists of 
two sets: the set of nodes and the set of directed edges. In a BN, nodes represent random 
variables while the edges represent conditional relationships (casual relationships) 
between the connected nodes (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007; Ben-Gal, 2007). If an edge 
connects from node A to node B, then variable of B depends on the variable of A. Hence, 
node A and node B are referred to as a parent and a child, respectively. A BN represents a 
joint probability distribution (JPD) over a set of random variables. Each variable has a 




if a BN specifies the unique joint probability distribution P(A) over a set of random 
variables A = {A1, A2, …., An}, then P(A) given by the product of all conditional 
probabilities specified in BN (equation 3.1): 
 
𝑃(𝐴) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖 |𝑝𝑎(𝐴𝑖))
𝑛
𝑖 ,             (3.1) 
 
where 𝑝𝑎(𝐴𝑖) are the parents of Ai in the BN and P(A) reflects the properties of the BN 
(Pearl, 1988). 
 
A BN can be used to find out updated knowledge about the state of a variable given the 
evidence of another variable and thus Bayes’ theorem applies. According to the Bayes’ 
theorem, the posterior probability of a variable A given the evidence E can be expressed 
as (equation 3.2):  
         𝑃(𝐴|𝐸) =  
𝑃(𝐴)×𝑃(𝐸|𝐴)
𝑃(𝐸)
,          (3.2) 
 
where P(A) is the prior probability of A, P(E|A) is the likelihood function that represents 
the likelihood of the evidence E if the hypothesis A is true and P(E) is the normalizing 
factor that represents the prior probability of E when the evidence itself is true. P(E) can 
be calculated using the law of total probability (equation 3.3): 
 





A and ?̅? are mutually exclusive that (𝐴 , ?̅?) = 0. An example of a simplified BN model is 
presented in Figure 3.1 to illustrate the application of Bayes’ theorem and inter-
dependence among the variables. A marine operational system failure (C) may occur due 
to poor visibility (A) and human failure (B). In Figure 3.1(a), A and B are marginally 
independent, which means poor visibility has no influence on human error whereas 
Figure 3.1(b) represents that A and B are dependent given C as the likelihood of human 
error may increase if poor visibility occurred. The CPTs are presented in Figure 3.1 and 
the probability of operational system failure, P(C) can be calculated using equation 3.3 
for both cases such that P(C) = P(A, B)P(C|A, B) + P(A, ?̅?)P(C|A, ?̅?) + P(?̅?, B)P(C|?̅?, B) 
+ P(?̅?, ?̅?)P(C|?̅?, ?̅?). The occurrence probability of operational system failure, P(C) is 
calculated as 0.0168 and 0.0181 when the parent nodes, A and B are independent and 
dependent, respectively. Assuming the operational system failure has already occurred, 
the posterior probability of the occurrence of poor visibility can be calculated using 
equation 3.2. 
 








Similarly, the posterior probability of human error occurrence becomes P(B|C) = 0.9463. 
Now, in Figure 3.1(b), human error is conditionally dependent on poor visibility, then the 
updated probability of human error would be: P(B) = P(B|A)P(A) + P(B|?̅?)P(?̅?) = 




visibility and human error becomes 0.1796 and 0.9586, respectively. Hence, it is evident 
that the conditional relations of the nodes significantly change the outcome.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Simplified BN showing CPTs and inter dependency between nodes 
 
This concept has been implemented to address the conditional dependence of the 
contributing factors of marine logistics support risk model. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 







Figure 3.2: The proposed methodology for marine logistics risk management in harsh 
environments 
 
Step 1 - Development of marine logistics risk model using Bayesian network: The BN 
model is developed based on the concept of marine logistics operation and the fault tree 
model presented in the previous study. A marine logistics operation consists of the 




reported, an uninterrupted voyage, functionality of on-board equipment, arrival at the site 
within the desired time limit and on-site operation (Figure 3.3). The parameters associated 
with each phase of a logistics operation are selected based on detailed discussion with the 
stakeholders, which include individuals such as offshore oil and gas operators, marine 
transportation consultants, subject matter experts, and academics in the related fields. 
Stakeholders have reviewed these parameters and the model is developed based on the 
logical relationships among these key contributing parameters. These parameters are 
further confirmed through a detail literature review and the outcome of which is presented 
in (Rahman et al., 2019). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Logistics operation or emergency response (ER) process (Rahman et al., 2019) 
 
The primary FT model (Rahman et al., 2019) is mapped to a BN based on the approach 




model are assigned to the corresponding root nodes of the BN model as prior 
probabilities. The logical relationships of the intermediate nodes and the leaf nodes with 
the root nodes are defined by the conditional probability tables (CPT). The primary BN 
model is presented in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The basic BN model for marine offshore logistics operation 
 
Step 2 - Advanced Bayesian network model: The primary BN model suffers from several 
limitations which are: 1) Interdependencies among the contributing factors are not 
considered, 2) Failure due to promptness is not developed and 3) Logical relationships 
among the factors are developed based on simplified OR/AND-gates that do not always 






1) The following interdependencies are addressed in the model: 
- Equipment functionality failure may affect onboard fire/emergency response. 
- Engine issues may affect both ship departure readiness and unobstructed voyage. 
- Human error may result operational system failure, communication failure, 
onboard fire/emergency response and equipment functionality failure. 
- Existing environmental conditions may affect response time, unobstructed transit 
of vessel and onsite operation.  
- Ice conditions are related to wind and wave conditions. 
 
In this study, “human error” is considered as a single parameter. However, the human 
error could be considered as a series of nodes that would represent different modes of 
human related failure. A detail study can be performed as a human reliability analysis 
(HRA) exercise aiming to identify the causes and sources of human errors and to provide 
an estimation of the human error probabilities (HEPs). A performance shaping factor 
(PSF) is often used in HRA that systematically quantifies the potential influences of a 
factor on human performance. Aspects of an individual’s characteristics, environment, 
organization or task specifically influence human performance, and change the likelihood 
of human error (Blackman et al., 2008). In a more detailed study of human factors for 
marine operational failure, the BN model can be further expanded into multiple modes 
based on PSFs and their dependencies could also be considered. Some of the detail 
studies of the influence of human factors in a harsh offshore operation were presented in 




3.5 to explain how human error probability can be estimated for different scenarios. In an 
emergency response to a remote offshore installation, human error may occur due to 
various mode of human failure such as wrong detection, failure to act and inconsistent 
response. The corresponding PSFs and probabilities of these scenarios are presented in 
Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1: Performance shaping factors of different scenarios of human error 
Scenarios 





Lack of training/experience (PSF1) 0.1 
wrong procedure (PSF2) 0.05 
Failed to act 
Distraction (PSF3) 0.06 
Stress (PSF4) 0.09 
 Physical condition (PSF5) 0.03 
Inconsistent response 
Lack of training/experience (PSF1) 0.1 
Complexity (PSF6) 0.07 
 
 




2) Promptness is further developed as a function of the distance between the platform and 
the onshore base. In addition, promptness failure could happen if the ship fails to depart 
or disrupts during its voyage.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
3) Probabilistic gates such as noisy gates are introduced that give the flexibility to choose 
an intermediate state of an event between 1 and 0 unlike AND/OR gates. In this way, the 
estimation of failure probability can be optimized. The CPTs are modified based on the 
experts’ opinion who have managed several offshore safety related projects and have 
several years of experience in the relevant area. Evidence theory can be used to integrate 
multiple experts’ opinion. This also helps to deal with the uncertainties and considers the 
conflict of knowledge between the experts. Evidence theory was first proposed by 
Dempster (1967) and later expanded by Shafer (1976), which is also known as the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). In DST, the main three functions are: the basic 
probability assignment function (bpa or m), the belief function (Bel), and the plausibility 
function (Pl). An event probability is defined with a set of lower and upper bound values, 
which are denoted as belief (Bel) and plausibility (Pl), respectively, and a mass (bpa) is 
assigned for the uncertainty or ignorance about that event. According to the Dempster 
rule of combination, multiple belief functions from different sources are combined 
through their basic probability assignments (m) that considers that knowledge sources are 
independent and uses the conjunctive operation (AND) for aggregation. For example, if 




different experts, the combination (called m12(Pi)) is calculated from the aggregation of 
two bpa’s m1(PA) and m2(PB) in the following manner (equation 3.4): 
 
         𝑚12(𝑃𝑖) = {
0, 𝑃𝑖 = ∅
∑ 𝑚1(𝑃𝐴)× 𝑚2(𝑃𝐵)𝑃𝐴∩𝑃𝐵=𝑃𝑖
1−𝑘
, 𝑃𝑖 ≠ ∅
    (3.4) 
 
where k represents basic probability mass associated with a conflicting opinion. The 
Dempster rule of combination uses (1 – k) as normalizing factor that ignores all 
conflicting evidence through normalization. Further details about DST and the 
combination rules of evidence can be found in Shafer (1986), Sentz and Ferson (2002), 
Ferdous et al. (2011), Rahman et al. (2019). The modified BN model is presented in 
Figure 3.6: The modified BN model for marine offshore logistics operation. 
 
 




Step 3 – Critical factor analysis: Sensitivity analysis is very important to identify the 
most critical factors. First, backward analysis or diagnostic analysis can be performed 
where the states of some nodes are instantiated, and the updated probabilities of 
conditionally dependent nodes are calculated (Bobbio et al., 2001; Khakzad et al., 2013). 
The ratio of posterior and prior probabilities can be used as an index for identifying the 
critical factors (Abimbola, 2016). For example, the ratio of posterior and prior 
probabilities of poor visibility and human error in the model presented in Figure 1.1(a) 
can be calculated as: P(A|C)/P(A) = 0.1134/0.01 = 11.34 and P(B|C)/P(B) = 0.9463/0.1 = 
9.46. This suggests that operational system failure is relatively more sensitive to poor 
visibility than human error. 
 
Alternatively, importance measure can be found by evaluating the risk reduction worth or 
top event’s sensitivity. It is defined as the decrease in the probability of the top event, 
given that a particular event does not occur. To obtain the risk reduction worth for an 
event, the top event failure probability is quantified by assigning zero probability of 
failure to the given primary event (Khan et al., 2001; Khakzad et al., 2011).  
 
Step 4 – Safety measures and risk management: In the context of risk management, safety 
measures are classified into three types: inherent, engineered and procedural (Khan et al., 
2003). In safety related decision making, inherent safety measures, that avoid hazards 
instead of controlling them, are usually given priority when compared to the other types 




measures, engineered safety measures are the addition of new safety equipment that can 
be either passive or active systems depending on the nature of their functions. Passive 
safety measures are preferred than active safety measures as they help to reduce the effect 
of an accident and do not depend on external controlling or activating systems. Next, 
procedural safety measures control hazards through personnel education, training and 
management. Such measures include standard operating procedures, safety rules and 
procedures, personnel training, and management systems to improve human performance 
(Yuan et al., 2015). 
 
Safety measures can be applied in two stages: prevention and mitigation. To estimate the 
complete risk, a consequence model is required along with probabilistic failure model as 
the risk can be calculated as (equation 3.5): 
 
       𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖  ×  𝐿𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,    (3.5) 
 
where 𝑃𝑖 refers to the probability of the i-th consequence and 𝐿𝑖 stands for the 
corresponding losses, which are usually converted into equivalent financial losses. 
 
Once the critical factors for a system have been identified, specific safety measures can 
be assigned for each factor based on experts’ suggestions. The effect of each safety 




management strategies. The percentage of risk reduction (%RR) can be calculated using 
equation 3.6 (Yuan et al., 2015).  
 
                                                 %RR = (R – RSMi)/R × 100    (3.6) 
 
where R is the risk of marine logistics failure before application of safety measures; RSMi 
is the risk of the system after the application of the i-th safety measure. A higher %RR 
value of any safety measure indicates that it can reduce risk more effectively. An 
illustrated example of the proposed methodology is provided in the following sections.   
3.3 Application of the Proposed Methodology 
3.3.1 Description of the Case Study 
A case study is presented in this section to illustrate the application of the proposed 
model. The exploration in the Flemish Pass Basin is a suitable example to describe the 
scenarios envisaged in this study. This drilling location is approximately 480 kilometres 
east of St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador. The water depths in this area are ranging 
from 500 to over 3,000 m (Project Description Summary – Equinor, 2016). Figure 3.7 






Figure 3.7: Exploration drilling location in the Flemish Pass Basin (Source: Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, date retrieved: August 21, 2018)  
 
This region exhibits harsh environmental conditions including intense storms and the 
presence of ice (sea ice and icebergs). Superstructure icing can also occur between 
December and March because of the temperature, wind and wave conditions. Restricted 
visibility due to fog is also common, especially in the months of spring and summer, 
when warm air masses overlie the cold ocean surface. The worst visibility conditions are 
experienced in July. During the months of winter, restricted visibility can also be caused 
by snow in addition to fog and mist (ISO 19906:2010). In addition, the distances between 
the onshore supply base and the offshore drilling locations impose extra challenge for 




3.3.2 Probability Data 
The modified BN model (Figure 3.6) represents the failure model of emergency logistics 
support for this case study. The failure probabilities of the contributing factors are listed 
in Table 3.2, which is based on a comprehensive literature survey (Rahman et al., 2019).  
 





Fuel availability  3.97 × 10−4 Kum and Sahin, 2015 
Crew availability  3.97 × 10−4 Kum and Sahin, 2015 
Lifesaving appliances  1.00 × 10−3 Bercha et al., 2003 
Firefighting equipment 3.97 × 10−4 Kum and Sahin, 2015 
Navigation equipment 2.55 × 10−3 Antao et al., 2006 
Engine issues  2.6 × 10−4 Kum and Sahin, 2015 
Wind conditions  6.00 × 10−3 Apostolos et al., 2009 
Wave conditions 1.97 × 10−4 Apostolos et al., 2009 
Sea ice 2.75 × 10−3 Kum and Sahin, 2015 
Pressured ice 5.94 × 10−2 Kum and Sahin, 2015 
Iceberg 1.00 × 10−2 Apostolos et al., 2009 
Marine icing 1.50 × 10−4 Expert opinion 
Loss of hull integrity 1.33 × 10−4 
Christou and Konstantinidou, 
2012 
Poor visibility 7.00 × 10−4 Apostolos et al., 2009 
Navigational failure 2.00 × 10−6 Amrozowicz et al., 1997 
Human error 3.00 × 10−4 Apostolos et al., 2009 
Maintenance failure  1.00 × 10−4 Expert opinion 
Mechanical failure  5.46 × 10−2 Bercha et al. 2003 
Safety equipment maintenance 1.00 × 10−3 Expert opinion 
Remoteness 3.00 × 10−2 Expert opinion 
Mechanical failure (Communication) 1.00 × 10−5 Apostolos et al., 2009 
Software/control system failure 4.00 × 10−4 Apostolos et al., 2009 
PPE 5.00 × 10−3 Expert opinion 
Manpower  1.00 × 10−2 Expert opinion 




The failure probabilities of several factors are collected from Kum and Sahin (2015). The 
primary sources of their marine accident/incident data are Marine Accident Investigation 
Branch (MAIB)’s reports; accident data were analyzed by fuzzy fault trees to estimate 
occurrence probabilities. This study considered 65 arctic marine accidents reported from 
1993 – 2011. Another source of data is Apostolos et al. (2009), where traditional 
probabilistic risk analysis tools such as the fault tree and the Bayesian network were used 
for calculating failure probabilities. Amrozowicz et al. (1997) presented a probabilistic 
assessment of a ship’s navigational failure, where an analysis of tanker grounding using 
the fault tree was conducted. The probability data related to lifesaving appliances are 
obtained from Bercha et al. (2003). This information was deduced from full scale lifeboat 
launch data that was carried out in Canada and the United Kingdom. Navigation 
equipment failure data are collected from Antao et al. (2006); this source presents fault 
tree models of accident scenarios of Ro-Ro vessels for cargo and passengers. Christou 
and Konstantinidou (2012) conducted an analysis of oil and gas related accidents; data 
used in this study was primarily collected from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
MAIB, Worldwide Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD), and DNV. However, these 
sources provide only an example to choose a sensible value for demonstrating the 
methodology.  
 
Expert elicitation is required when data are not available, or it is difficult to measure the 
accuracy of data. It is a formal procedure for obtaining and combining knowledge. There 




fundamental works related to expert elicitation were published in Cooke (1991) and 
O’Hagan (1998). A scoring system is introduced in this process based on the scores of 
experts’ judgements and the level of certainty of their beliefs. The available methods to 
aggregate elicited judgements can be either behavioral, where the members of the expert 
panel interact with each other to reach a single distribution, or mathematical where 
individual assessments are analytically processed to obtain a combined probability 
distribution (Clemen and Winkler, 1999). An example of a behavioral approach is the 
Delphi method; the mathematical techniques include axiomatic and Bayesian approaches. 
In this paper, the evidence-based approach or the Dempster-Shafer Theory is 
implemented to aggregate the data collected from two experts. Both experts have PhD in 
the relevant subject. Expert 1 has 15-20 years of experience in offshore oil and gas related 
projects, whereas expert 2 has 5-10 years of experience in logistics operation. Since the 
data is collected from individuals, there may be some uncertainty in the data. The 
application of DST can help with this issue, which can address missing data and 
conflicting subjective data. This also helps to integrating data from multiple sources, 
filling missing data sources, resolving the issue of varying data for the same cause/event, 
and updating the probability when new information becomes available. Besides, it should 
be mentioned that a larger number of experts from heterogeneous backgrounds would 
have been better to gain more reliable results in this study. The aim of this study is to 
demonstrate the application of the approach, not to claim the accuracy of the outcome. 




approach can be applied to combine probability information from more than two experts 
when available.  
 
Since expert judgements are epistemic/subjective in nature, uncertainties may exist in the 
data. Several literatures suggested implementation of the evidence-based approach to 
overcome this type of uncertainties (Ayyub and Klir (2006), Sentz and Ferson (2002), 
Ferdous et al. (2009). An illustrated example to aggregate both experts’ conditional 
probability data for operational system failure using the Dempster rule of combination is 
presented in Figure 3.8. In DST, a belief mass (bpa or m) for each event is acquired from 
multiple sources i.e. expert 1 and expert 2. The bpa represents the degree of experts’ 
belief for each subset. In Figure 3.8, expert 1 reported the conditional probability of 
operational system failure is 75% true and 9% false when no human error occurred but 
failure due to poor visibility happened. Mathematically, this is written as m({T}) = 0.75, 
m({F)} = 0.09 and m({T,F}) = 1−m({T})−m({F}) = 0.16. Similarly, for expert 2, m({T}) = 
0.60, m({F)} = 0.17 and m({T,F}) = 0.23. The data acquired from two experts are 
aggregated using the DS rule presented in equation 3.4. The term (1 – k) can be 
interpreted as a normalization factor for the conflict among the evidential information. In 
DS rule of combination, it is assumed that the two sources of information are independent 







Figure 3.8: Combination of conditional probabilities from the experts using DS rule 
 
From the bpas, the lower bound and upper bound of an interval can be determined by 
equation 3.7 and equation 3.8, which are referred as belief (Bel) and plausibility (Pl), 
respectively. The belief (Bel) or lower bound for a set PA is the sum of all the basic 
probability assignments of the proper subsets PB of the set of interest PA, i.e., PB ⊆ PA. 
The plausibility (Pl) or upper bound is the sum of all the bpas of the sets PB that intersect 
the set of interest PA, i.e., PB ∩ PA ≠ ∅. Hence,  
 
            𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑃𝐴) =  ∑ 𝑚(𝑃𝐵 ⊆ 𝑃𝐴 𝑃𝐵)                            (3.7) 
 
𝑃𝑙(𝑃𝐴) =  ∑ 𝑚(𝑃𝐵 ∩ 𝑃𝐴 ≠ ∅ 𝑃𝐵)                          (3.8) 
 
The belief structure of operational system for the given condition is calculated as [0.8778, 
0.9228] and [0.0772, 0.1222] for failure and success, respectively. The conditional 




failure from the BN model in Figure 3.6. The estimated lower bound (Bel) and upper 
bound (Pl) of the occurrence of ER failure is 0.0848 and 0.0849, respectively. The failure 
probability of emergency response estimated in the example reflects slight deviation, 
however this an illustration to demonstrate how the uncertainty of expert knowledge can 
be accounted using this approach. 
3.3.3 Critical Factor Analysis 
In this section, the most critical factors of marine logistics operations are identified. One 
of the advantages of BN is probability updating that means the updated information 
(evidence) of some events can be utilized to estimate the probabilities of other factors of a 
system. Here, the occurrence of the logistics failure is set as evidence. Next, the 
probability of all contributing factors can be updated accordingly that gives the 
corresponding posterior probabilities. The ratio of posterior and prior probabilities can be 
calculated in which the higher value indicates the most sensitive factors. Figure 3.9 







Figure 3.9: BN model is simulated using GeNIe as the probability of ER failure is 1.0. 
 
The ratio of prior and posterior probabilities of the primary events are presented in Table 
3.3. The most sensitive change ratio is human error.  Mechanical failure, fuel availability, 
crew availability, lifesaving appliances, firefighting equipment, navigation equipment, 
hull integrity and navigational failure have similar sensitivity ratio. Other factors do not 


















Fuel availability  0.000397 0.003386 8.5280 
Crew availability  0.000397 0.003386 8.5280 
Lifesaving appliances  0.001 0.008528 8.5280 
Firefighting equipment  0.000397 0.003386 8.5280 
Navigation equipment  0.00255 0.021747 8.5280 
Engine issues  0.00026 0.002217 8.5280 
Wind conditions  0.006 0.041225 6.8708 
Wave conditions  0.000197 0.001357 6.8865 
Sea ice  0.00275 0.017658 6.4211 
Pressured ice  0.0594 0.381416 6.4211 
Iceberg  0.01 0.064211 6.4211 
Marine icing  0.00015 0.000963 6.4211 
Loss of hull integrity  0.000133 0.001134 8.5280 
Poor visibility 0.0007 0.005442 7.7748 
Navigational failure  0.000002 0.000017 8.5280 
Human error  0.0003 0.003510 11.6989 
Maintenance failure  0.0001 0.000646 6.4551 
Mechanical failure  0.0546 0.367678 6.7340 
Safety equipment maintenance  0.001 0.006454 6.4539 
Remoteness  0.003 0.023331 7.7769 
Mechanical failure 
(Communication) 
0.00001 0.000087 8.6550 
Software/control system failure  0.0004 0.003282 8.2041 
PPE  0.005 0.037295 7.4589 
Manpower  0.01 0.078700 7.8700 
Site Clearance  0.001 0.007049 7.0494 
 
In this section, the main phases of logistics operations are considered to analyze the risk 




probability improvement of logistics failure is estimated as percentage (Table 3.4). It is 
seen that the most critical phases of logistics operation are: (1) Promptness or vessel 
reaching the site on time and (2) On-site operation. Promptness depends on the distance 
of the site, vessel readiness, uninterrupted vessel transit and existing physical 
environments. The focus should be given to overcome the challenges of logistics 
operation associated with remoteness and onboard operations. 
  
Table 3.4: Sensitivity of the main phases of logistics operation 
ER failure after setting an 







Change ratio in 
percentage ((Pp - 
Pi)/Pi ×100) 




ER Failure | Unobstructed_Voyage 0.0631 25.53 
ER Failure | Equipment_Funtionality 0.0560 33.91 
ER Failure | Promptness 0.0432 49.08 
ER Failure | Onboard_Operation 0.0196 76.91 
  
3.4 Risk Management Strategies 
3.4.1 Identification of Safety Measures 
After analyzing the contributing factors, possible safety measures are identified that 
reduce the risk of logistics failure. If there are multiple solutions for a single factor, the 




needs an organized approach to take both the effects and costs of each safety measures 
into account, and thus to achieve an optimal risk management strategy. A safety measure 
has an effect either on the probabilities of the primary events or the potential 
consequences. Figure 3.10 illustrates some possible measures that can be applied during 
the major stages of marine logistics operation.  Different types of safety measures exhibit 
different characteristics, which are classified in Table 3.5. For instance, an inherent safety 
measure can be such that a vessel is designed and built to withstand in harsh operating 
conditions. Engineered measures i.e. innovative design, offshore refuge, additional 
inventory for logistics etc., need additional equipment or installations. For a safety 
measure that requires additional installation, the fixed cost might be much higher than the 
operating cost. Procedural measures such as inspection, maintenance or training involve 
regular operating costs. 
 
 






Table 3.5: Summary of safety measures in the context of ER failure 
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voyage 




































Advance technologies for 







The sensitivity analysis reveals that the most critical phases of logistics operation are 
promptness and onboard operation. In this study, the emphasis is to overcome the 
challenges with remoteness and onboard operations. Several alternative solutions are 





1. Offshore temporary refuge/hotel: The concept is to have a temporary hotel in a 
nearby offshore installation which can facilitate logistics support when a plant is 
at risk. It is different from the temporary refuge, which is located inside the 
production plant (Section 3 of ISO 19906). Muster stations are located within a 
temporary refuge where personnel assemble for evacuation. This temporary 
refuge/hotel could be a floating structure with a suitable mooring system. It should 
have all the necessary logistics of a supply vessel including trained personnel who 
can provide support to restore plants’ production and conduct rescue operation 
when the plant needs to be abandoned. An appropriate vessel suitable for this 
purpose would be required for transportation between the hotel and plant. A single 
offshore hotel can provide logistics to more than one offshore production plants if 
these are situated in close vicinity. The feasibility of such installation, and its 
conceptual design standards and performance benchmarks will be studied in a 
future work. 
 
2. High speed craft/emergency response vessel (ERV): The ERV should be capable 
of performing all emergency response support duties relevant to the assessed 
needs of the offshore facilities, its personnel and the environment. The ERV 
location should ensure that it is able to transit and respond to the specific 
emergency within the pre-determined maximum time period relating to the 
emergency. It should be capable of functioning under all possible environmental 




to its emergency response plan. The performance standards for the Emergency 
Response Vessel in remote harsh environment is presented in Barents 2020:  
RN04, Final Report, Phase 4. 
 
3. Standby Vessel: The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board and the 
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (the Boards) have 
issued guidelines to assist operators to achieve compliance with the Drilling and 
Production Regulations (the Regulations) respecting the suitability and capability 
of support craft as a standby vessel (SBV) to supply emergency services (Atlantic 
Canada Standby Vessel (AC-SBV) Guidelines: ISBN: 978-0-994-0857-0-2). 
Standby vessels are designed, constructed and maintained to operate safely and 
supply the necessary emergency services in the foreseeable physical 
environmental conditions prevailing within the area of operations. 
 
4. Nearby Ships: Ships near the offshore platform i.e. patrol vessels can be a 
secondary means of support if others are not available. The presence of a nearby 
ship that can provide support during the plants’ emergencies is uncertain; this 
should be considered in the risk analysis. 
 
5. Buffer Inventory: An alternative approach for the solution of logistics problem 




additional safety barrier for the plant. A conceptual design, performance standards 
and its feasibility need to be studied in detail. 
3.4.2 Safety Measures Allocation to the Model 
In Figure 3.11, the BN model for marine logistics operation incorporates the identified 
safety features, which are marked as green nodes. There are several alternative safety 
measures possible, which are presented with purple nodes.  
 
 
Figure 3.11: Safety measures allocation to the BN model. 
 
The impacts of a safety measure on the likelihood of an undesired event can be derived 
using the law of total probability. For example, if appropriate training is provided to 




human error, P(HE) can be calculated using equation 3.9 (Dianous and Fievez, 2006; 
Yuan et al., 2013). 
 
      P(HE) = P(HE|SMHE) × P(SMHE) + P(HE|𝑆𝑀𝐻𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) × P(𝑆𝑀𝐻𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅),  (3.9) 
 
In the above equation, P(SMHE) is the failure probability of training activities; 
P(HE|SMHE) refers to the conditional probability of human error given that the training 
has failed. Similarly,  is the conditional probability of human error given 
that the training is effective. A sample calculation is shown in Figure 3.12 and a 













Table 3.6: Comparison of probabilities with and without safety measures 























arrangements  3.94E-03 9.61E-04 
Inspection 3.94E-03 1.02E-03 
Engine issues Inspection   2.60E-04 3.23E-05 
Loss of hull integrity Ship structure   1.33E-04 2.11E-05 
Unobstructed voyage 
failure 




















Human error Training   3.00E-04 3.27E-05 
Promptness   
Offshore 
refuge 5.17E-02 5.17E-04 
Novel high 
speed craft 5.17E-02 9.67E-03 
Nearby ships 5.17E-02 2.37E-02 
Standby 






inventory 7.70E-02 3.05E-02 
Advance technologies 





To estimate the complete risk value of ER failure, a consequence model should be 
considered. Consequence models help to calculate the potential damage resulting from the 
logistics failure along with the probability of the outcomes. The study presents a scenario 
where an accident has already occurred, and an emergency support has been requested. 
The failure of emergency response means the onboard personnel need to evacuate the 
platform if the accident cannot be controlled. Therefore, the consequences of ER failure 
are categorized into the following:  
 
i. Accident: Onboard personnel managed to escape from the accident site and 
evacuated successfully. 
ii. Major Accident: Onboard personnel managed to escape from the accident site but 
failed to evacuate the platform. 
iii. Catastrophic: Onboard personnel failed to escape from the accident site. 
 
The crew need to assemble at the muster station to evacuate the platform. Evacuation 
would not be possible if escape failed. The complete risk model is presented in Figure 
3.10. The failure probabilities of escape and evacuation in offshore platform accidents are 
taken as 0.08 and 0.1, respectively (Ping et al., 2017). The consequence severity matrix 







Table 3.7: Consequence types 
Consequence Dollar value 
equivalent 
(Million) 
Asset loss  Human loss  Environment 
loss 
 Reputation 








potential threat to 










Major accident 50-100 M Loss of all 
equipment/ 
product 




brief note on 
international 
media 




than type A since 
personnel could 










Risk due to logistics failure before and after the application of safety measures is 
calculated using equation 3.5, which is presented in Table 3.8. The method is illustrated 
for five alternative safety measures. For example, the risk without any safety measures 
can be calculated as: 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖  ×  𝐿𝑖  
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1.46E-02 × 25 Million + 6.79E-03 × 75 
Million + 6.79E-04 × 75 Million = 0.96 Million. Subsequently, the percentage of risk 
reduction of each safety measure is calculated using equation 3.6 i.e. %RR of offshore 
refuge can be calculated as: %RR (Offshore refuge) = (0.96 – 0.70)/0.96 × 100 = 26.99%. 




shows that buffer inventory and offshore refuge have the highest %RR values among 
these five measures. About 30% of risk can be reduced if a nearby offshore refuge or a 
buffer inventory adjacent to the platform is used, which addresses the challenge of prompt 
response. An additional advantage of offshore refuge over buffer inventory is that a single 
installation can support more than one offshore platform in case these are in a close 
proximity. Also, effective training of emergency crew and onboard personnel, improving 
the reliability of logistics equipment, innovative technologies suitable for cold weather 
conditions can significantly reduce onboard operational challenges. Hence, the 
combination of these measures can be considered in the decision making process for the 
offshore logistics risk management. 
 
























ER failure 8.49E-02 6.53E-02 6.80E-02 7.73E-02 6.83E-02 5.98E-02 - 
Accident 1.46E-02 1.07E-02 1.17E-02 1.33E-02 1.17E-02 1.03E-02 25M 
Major 
accident 
6.79E-03 4.96E-03 5.44E-03 6.18E-03 5.46E-03 4.78E-03 75M 
Catastrophic 6.79E-04 4.96E-04 5.44E-04 6.18E-04 5.46E-04 4.78E-04 120M 






Figure 3.13: Percentage of risk reduction after the application of safety measures 
 
In this case study, the occurrence probability of each consequence is estimated based on 
the conditional probability data from two experts which are aggregated by the DS rule of 
combination. This approach may address the uncertainty due to expert knowledge 
elicitation from multiple sources where a range of occurrence probability of events can be 
obtained. The ignorance and belief of experts’ knowledge are defined based on the basic 
event probability assignments and the DS rule of combination provides a lower bound 
and an upper bound of event probabilities which are also referred as belief and 
plausibility, respectively. Figure 3.14 shows the lower and the upper bounds of each 
consequence in logistics operation failure, which are calculated using the model based on 






Figure 3.14: Belief structure of consequences 
 
The Bayesian approach is implemented in this study to describe the dependencies among 
the parameters of offshore logistics operational failure and the probabilistic assessment of 
possible safety measures in risk reduction. The objective of this case study is to 
demonstrate the application of the approach, which could be further tested and applied for 
similar scenarios. Precise outcome can be obtained through further experimentation and 
validation using more data from subject matter experts. Also, an alternative approach to 
perform this analysis could be the use of influence diagrams (ID). An ID is a graphical 
tool that can be used for mapping probabilistic dependencies among the variables in a 




failure involves uncertainty and decision-making steps, the applicability of ID within this 
problem can be further investigated. A simple ID is presented in Figure 3.15. Two 
elliptical chance variables are risk due to ER failure and cost. The rectangular decision 
variable indicates the possible safety measures or actions could be taken by the decision 
makers or stakeholders. These action variables may affect the belief or probability of risk 
and cost. The rounded rectangle represents a deterministic function to estimate the 
reduction of risk, which is the function of measured risk and action taken. The hexagonal 
node represents the risk reduction worth, which is a measure of value or satisfaction with 
possible outcomes with respect to various actions taken. 
 
 
Figure 3.15: An influence diagram for decision making in the risk management of offshore 






This paper presents a risk model to analyze operational challenges of marine logistics 
support in harsh environments and proposes risk management strategies to reduce risk. 
An advanced Bayesian approach is used to address the interdependencies and conditional 
relationships among the critical factors. The main contribution of this paper is 
summarized below: 
 
1. The inherent limitations of primary BN model for marine logistics risk are 
identified by analyzing the network’s outcomes. An advanced BN model 
addressed the interdependencies of contributing factors and the casual 
relationships are well-defined based on experts’ knowledge. 
2. A case study is presented to illustrate the logistics risk model. Prior probabilities 
used in the analysis are based on historical data from literature survey and domain 
experts. Evidence-based theory is implemented to combine the data from two 
experts. 
3. Sensitivity analysis reveals that the most critical phases of this particular scenario 
are promptness of response and onboard operation.  
4. Safety measures to control and mitigate the marine logistics failure are identified 
and integrated with the risk model to estimate the reduction of risk. Risk 
management strategies are developed that emphasize the challenges associated 




5. Several alternative solutions are considered in the analysis as an effort to find the 
optimal measures. The concept of offshore temporary refuge or a buffer inventory 
within the platform can be very promising solutions for the logistics problem in a 
remote harsh environment.  
 
The economic aspects of these safety measures need to be studied further. Also, discrete 
probabilities are used in this study. More robust estimation can be obtained if time 
sensitive data can be used i.e. seasonal probability values. In this study, human error is 
considered as one parameter, which could be a combination of a series of nodes that 
would represent different modes of human related failure. With a more detail literature 
review and practical datasets, the accuracy of this outcome can be further improved. 
Scarcity of the relevant data is a big challenge for this study. To address the data 
limitation, integration of the fuzzy theory with the existing Bayesian model could be a 
promising approach. 
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Abstract 
The design and operational planning of an offshore installation must consider 




Among the major operational issues, logistics support during routine operations and 
emergencies is critical. The logistics support from an onshore base to a remote and harsh 
environment offshore production facility is not sufficiently reliable and quick. In this 
study, the concept of an intermediate offshore resource centre (ORC) as a potential 
solution to the logistics problem is presented. The purpose, functional requirements and 
the conceptual design of an ORC with an illustrative example are discussed. A modular 
volume-limited ship design concept is adopted here to determine the principal particulars 
of the ORC in the concept design phase. The required functional elements of the ORC are 
identified, and then the physical space required for each element is represented 
graphically as a scaled block with the required volume. The principal dimensions are 
determined after arranging these functional blocks within a ship-shaped envelope. Finally, 
the concept design of the vessel system is tested and validated with an analysis of the 
vessel stability and mooring requirements.  
Keywords: Offshore resource centre; remote operation; emergency management, 
offshore logistic; harsh environment; offshore risk analysis. 
4.1 Introduction 
Extraction of hydrocarbon in northern offshore regions poses significant challenges due 
to extreme physical environmental conditions (Hamilton, 2011; Khan et al., 2014; 
Meling, 2013; Necci et al., 2019). In addition to the environmental challenge, regular 
logistics support and emergency response become more and more difficult for remote 
platforms. Long-distance operation of helicopters is particularly risky (Nascimento et al., 




favorable. The idea of an intermediate offshore resource centre (ORC) originated when 
considering these issues. In previous studies (Rahman et al., 2020, 2019) the logistical 
challenges of remote offshore operations are identified. These papers present a 
probabilistic risk analysis using the fault tree (Rahman et al., 2019) and the Bayesian 
network (Rahman et al., 2020) that essentially estimated the risk of logistics support 
operation failure in a remote harsh environment. In the main, these risks are shown to be 
most significantly associated with the distance from shore-based support, particularly the 
extended flying distance for helicopter based supply and crew transfer. Additional risk of 
logistics failure is associated with the difficulty in providing timely emergency response 
and in mobilizing shore-based equipment and assets in response to a remote offshore 
incident. One practical solution to mitigate both these risks is to provide an intermediate 
platform or vessel that allows aircraft an intermediate landing/refueling location and at 
the same time provides a forward staging point for emergency response equipment.  
 
In the current study, the space requirement and thus the overall dimensions of the ORC 
are estimated to meet the functional requirements for logistics supply to single remote 
platform. However, the concept and the approach remain the same for supporting multiple 
oil field operations. The space requirement to support multiple platforms can be 
determined using the same approach to that presented in this study. Thus the concept 
remains the same but the size may increase. Such a platform probably becomes more and 





An ORC reduces the risk for daily operations in addition to providing a forward base for 
emergency response. Thus, the ORC has two primary mission requirements for cases 
where an offshore development is exceptionally remote from land-based support: 
 
- Provide an intermediate point for helicopter operations that enables refueling, 
alternate landing and shorter transit distance. 
- Provide a forward staging or response asset for emergency response in case of 
fire, spill, sinking or ice damage. 
 
This study is part of a larger research project aimed at identifying risks and risk reduction 
measures, including the economic costs and benefits of the risk reduction measures, with 
a particular emphasis on remote offshore operations in harsh environments. The objective 
of this component of the larger study is to develop one particular risk reduction measure 
which addresses the most significant risks identified in earlier parts of the study. 
 
The concept of an intermediate offshore base for various logistics support is not entirely 
new. The US military studied the idea of a mobile offshore base (MOB) for helicopter 
and fixed-wing cargo aircraft operation, maintenance and other military logistical 
supports. The mission requirements for fixed wing aircraft needed a very large floating 
structure of approximately 1500 m in length. The technical and financial feasibility were 
both significant concerns associated with such an enormous floating structure 




1998). (Nordbø, 2013) presented mathematical models to study the feasibility of 
intermediate bulk storage to support multiple remote hydrocarbon production facilities. 
The concept of such a logistics hub for personnel accommodation is found in (Moyano, 
2016; Vilameá et al., 2011). Accommodation vessels and semi-submersibles also referred 
to as “Floatels” are often used near or together with the production facilities for 
accommodating offshore workers (Floatel International Group, 2019; Prosafe, 2019; 
Pérez et al., 2012).  
 
None of the above concepts provide a suitable starting point for the proposed ORC, and 
thus a concept is developed from basic requirements. The conceptual model of an 
offshore resource centre starts with defining functional requirements and environmental 
constraints followed by selection of the type of structure that can be suitable for these 
requirements. Space requirements are estimated for each of the functional requirements to 
determine the overall space requirement for the ORC. Figure 4.1 illustrates the basic 
functional concept of an intermediate distance offshore resource centre (ORC) for 
logistics support of one or more offshore platforms. In particular, offshore personnel are 
carried on/off the ORC from the onshore base and the production platform by helicopters 
(preferable and weather permitted) or marine vessels. The ORC thus needs to be equipped 
with facilities to accommodate in-transit personnel during their transit hours. A more 
detailed study would be required to model scheduling of such transfer operations that is 




provide a conceptual design outline for a moored vessel that meets the identified 
requirements.   
 
 
Figure 4.1: A solution for logistics support and emergency response in remote harsh 
environments 
 
4.2 ORC Performance Requirements 
Performance requirements for the ORC stem from the previous risk analysis (Rahman et 
al., 2020, 2019) and from the operating environment. The risk reduction objectives for the 
platforms are to reduce the effective flying distance to the production platform, and to 




operating location and are covered in more detail in the following section. Environmental 
conditions are location specific and in the present study we have chosen the North West 
Atlantic as an illustrative operational scenario. This environment presents a number of 
challenges. This choice is also driven by current consideration of a remote location for 
offshore oil production. 
4.2.1 Risk reduction objectives 
The main operational function of the ORC is to serve as a helicopter intermediate landing 
point. This function requires that the ORC be positioned at a fixed location to provide an 
intermediate stopping point for regularly scheduled helicopter operations to and from the 
remote production facility. This would incorporate the ability to land and refuel two 
helicopters simultaneously and potentially provide service to one. The concept of an ORC 
as a mid-way stopping point for one or more remote platforms means that it is entirely 
likely that one helicopter would be inbound while another is outbound. Furthermore, in 
the case of emergency it would be advantageous to be able to operate two transports and 
have some redundancy in the system.  
 
As part of the role of intermediate landing point, the ORC would also provide temporary 
accommodation with required amenities for in-transit offshore personnel. This will be 
used as a station for the personnel of the production platform on their way to/from the 





The final regular function of the ORC would be to provide local and regional 
communications with the production facilities, nearby vessels and other installations in 
the vicinity, rescue craft and coast stations. 
 
The second primary function of the ORC is as an emergency response centre. In this 
mode the ORC would respond to emergency incidents such as fire, explosions, leak, 
spills, human or weather-induced damages, equipment failure, etc. Response equipment, 
particularly for spill containment would be stored on board the ORC to speed reaction to 
offshore incidents by supply and standby vessels. The ORC would also provide, in case of 
platform abandonment, the capacity to accommodate evacuated personnel in emergency 
conditions. This would include the ability to deal with casualties. 
 
A possible scenario is considered to be that the ORC moves temporarily closer to the 
location of a disaster while standby and other vessels deal with the actual events using 
equipment and supplies drawn from that stored on the ORC. This may be augmented by 
transferring an emergency logistics support team to respond to an incident, from the shore 
base to the ORC. However, this mode of response may not be optimum if it limits flight 
operations by increasing the flying distance to the ORC. Rather than preclude this 
response possibility at this concept stage, the system is conceived to provide the ability to 
move off station for emergency response. In either mode of response – on or off station – 





Hence, the performance requirements of the ORC can be summarized as: 
- Maintain position at a fixed location with an ability to move. 
- Provide a base for helicopter landing, refueling and service. 
- Provide short term in-transit accommodation for regular passengers. 
- Have the ability to move off station in the event of emergency. 
- Provide short term accommodation for emergency responders. 
- Provide forward storage and distribution of emergency response equipment and 
supplies 
- Accommodate personnel from the production platform in case of evacuation. 
- Provide medical facilities for emergency treatment. 
- Provide local and regional communications with the production facilities, nearby 
vessels and other installations in the vicinity, rescue craft and coast stations. 
- Act as an incident command centre for emergency response. 
4.2.2 Environmental Conditions 
The Flemish Pass Basin is chosen for a case study to illustrate the concept design 
development of the ORC. Although some aspects of an ORC are site independent, other 
aspects would be dependent on location. Thus the basic functions are dictated by the 
distance of the supported platform from shore, but environmental conditions are site 
specific and thus it is necessary to have an example location to fully develop the concept. 
Other locations would maintain the basic concept and concept development process but 





The Flemish Pass basin is located approximately 480 km east of St. John’s, 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Equinor Canada Ltd. (Equinor) is proposing to conduct an 
exploration drilling project in the Flemish Pass Basin between 2019 and 2027 (Canada 
Impact Assessment Act, 2019). In this study, the proposed ORC would be located at an 
intermediate location between the shore (St. John’s) base and the drilling sites. Although 
the Flemish Pass is a deep water location at the edge of the continental shelf, the ORC is 
likely to be located on the Grand Banks, which is part of the continental shelf, as that is 
the intermediate location – see Figure 4.2. 
 
 





This example location is immediately relevant as the region is in the early stages of 
consideration for development and the distance from land is likely to be the most 
challenging aspect of the development. This provides a real-life example that fits the 
ORC concept. In addition, this region lacks the density of existing offshore installations 
that can provide mutual support such as would be available in other regions such as the 
North Sea.  
 
Information about physical environmental conditions off Newfoundland (near the Grand 
Banks and Flemish Pass regions) is extracted from (ISO 19906, 2010; Nalcor Energy, 
2017). These regions are considered to be harsh environments conditions due to the 
likelihood of intense storms and the presence of seasonal ice (pack ice and icebergs). Ice 
accretion on marine structures can also occur between December and March because of 
temperature, wind and wave conditions. During the spring and summer months, poor 
visibility often occurs due to fog. Restricted visibility may also occur during winter 
months caused by snow in addition to fog and mist. Representative physical 
















Water Depth   550-1200 75-125 
Wind Speed (m/s) 
Mean (Annual) 9.74 9.17 
100 year (Annual) 33.4 32.5 
Significant Wave Height 
(m) 
Mean (Annual) 3.23 2.97 
100 year (Annual) 16.3 15.6 
Current Velocity (m/s) 
Average 0.22 0.18 
100 year extreme value 1.38 1.3 
Pack Ice 
Annual mean pack ice concentration 4/10-6/10 4/10-6/10 
Floe thickness (m) 0.7-1.2 0.7-1.2 
Iceberg 
Total Iceberg Counts (open water) between 
1998-2012 
22 442 
Mean iceberg size (m) 66 85 
Harshness Index Fleming-Drover 2.65 2.27 
 
The harshness index suggests that the Flemish Pass region has more extreme 
environmental conditions than the Grand Banks which has higher wind speed, wave 
height, water depth. Although, Data shows that there are fewer icebergs in the Flemish 
Pass area than Grand Banks. The physical environment of both these areas is considered 




4.3 Concept Development 
4.3.1 Platform Type 
Based on the requirements outlined above, several platform options were evaluated, 
including a fixed platform, a semi-submersible platform, and a ship-shaped platform. 
Since one of the functions of the ORC is that it should be able to respond during 
emergency conditions, it must be a floating structure with a propulsion system. This 
eliminates the idea of a fixed platform. Although, a semi-submersible has lower motions 
than a ship-shaped vessel, a ship-shaped vessel is preferable to a semi-submersible in ice 
conditions although motion stability needs to be considered for determining the principal 
dimensions of a vessel to ensure crew comfort and safer helicopter operation in expected 
sea conditions. Furthermore, it is expected that a ship would achieve faster response for 
emergency support.  
4.3.2 Positioning 
The ORC is expected to be moored at an intermediate location on the Grand Banks and 
thus in relatively shallow approximately 75m – 125m water. The vessel may also operate 
in deep water (550-1200m) and will be subject to high wind and waves. Also, there is a 
likelihood of the presence of pack ice and icebergs over the operating region. Either 
dynamic positioning (DP) or anchor mooring can be used for station keeping in this water 





The life cycle cost of a full time DP system is relatively expensive. There are regulatory 
requirements for system redundancy and equipment space that introduce significant initial 
cost. In comparison, the initial cost of an anchor mooring system is lower but costs 
associated with the on-site installation offset some of the lower equipment cost. 
 
The more significant drawback is that during operation, a full time DP system requires 
continuous fuel supply to keep the system active, which adds to the operating costs in 
terms of both fuel costs and delivery.  
 
The requirement to minimize vessel motions and mooring loads leads to a preference for 
a weathervaning system rather than a spread mooring. This led to consideration of a 
scaled-down turret mooring which would provide the weathervaning capability but did 
not require the fluid transfer capability fitted in most offshore turret moorings. In a turret 
mooring system, several mooring legs are attached to a turret that includes bearings to 
allow the vessel to rotate 360° around the anchor legs. Turret moorings are mostly used 
for weathervaning monohulled vessels. This enables the vessel to change heading into the 
dominant weather thus minimizing environmental loads and vessel motions. A turret may 
be mounted outside the bow or inside the forward half of the vessel hull in an internal 
turret configuration. The internal configuration is preferable for more severe 
environments particularly those with ice as the mooring components are protected from 





A disconnectable version of a turret mooring provides for the stated requirements to move 
off station in emergencies. Disconnectable versions of the internal turret consist of a 
submerged spider buoy coupled to the lower portion of the rotating turret and supporting 
the individual mooring lines. When the buoy is disconnected, it sinks to a predetermined 
depth and supports the mooring lines above the seabed making reconnection relatively 
straightforward (Chakrabarti, 2005). 
 
A typical example of a disconnectable internal turret is the Terra Nova FPSO turret 
system (Duggal et al., 2000). The Terra Nova FPSO operates in similar environmental 
conditions. The basic ideas of this system can be adopted for the ORC concept. However, 
the mission and size of the ORC is substantially different from the Terra Nova FPSO and 
thus the details of the ORC mooring system would be relatively simpler and smaller.  
 
In summary, considering the required functions of the ORC and the example 
environmental conditions, a full time DP system was judged to be too operationally and 
environmentally expensive as the positioning system and a passive weathervaning anchor 
mooring was judged to be preferable.  
 
The possible use of a DP system for mooring assist or for position maintenance when off 
the mooring is incorporated into the concept but in this case the system is supplementary 




4.3.3 Vessel Development 
Having established the basic requirements for a ship shaped platform on a passive 
weathervaning and disconnectable mooring, the layout of the vessel itself was developed. 
The ORC has elements of widely varying ship types and there is no single historical basis 
ship type to start the concept design process. The mission requirements of ORC partially 
match those of offshore support/standby vessels, accommodation vessels/flotels, and 
military fleet support ships. The ORC needs much larger capacity than an offshore supply 
vessel. Accommodation vessels or flotels are specifically designed for passenger 
accommodation and not designed for emergency support. The ORC has a requirement to 
accommodate in-transit platform crew, or possibly evacuees, generally for short periods 
but possibly for longer periods of up to a day or two. Floatels provide longer term 
accommodation and food service for a similar client group and thus some of the features 
of floatels were considered in developing the ORC. Fleet replenishment vessels are larger 
ships used by the military to provide logistics support to combat vessels. These vessels 
are frequently based on RO-RO vessels due to a requirement to deliver land forces, which 
is not a mission requirement of the ORC. Since there is exactly no basis ship for ORC, 
but there are elements of ORC in a number of existing ship types, the concept design is 
developed using a process where the desired particulars and design features of all these 
types of ships are used. 
 Helicopter operation  
The ORC includes two helicopter platforms to meet the functional requirements. 




ORC operation: transporting crews to/from the onshore base and production platform, and 
emergency support such as search and rescue operations. Since regular helicopter 
operation would be conducted in two directions, there would be a significant number of 
inbound and outbound flights to the ORC. In addition, in the situation when one helideck 
is occupied by a helicopter, then another landing area would be required if another 
helicopter needs to land. Based on this demand, the ORC would have two full sized 
helidecks. In addition, there is an expectation that helicopters may need to be serviced or 
wait out inclement weather so a hangar is fitted to one of the helicopter decks for storage 
of one (or more) of the helicopters.  
 
The proposed relatively high frequency of helicopter operations requires consideration of 
a control tower for regional air traffic management and for landing and takeoff control. 
This space would ideally have visual contact with both of the helicopter decks and so 
would be located centrally in the vessel either above or just below the bridge deck. This 
has been incorporated into the concept. 
 
Current operations on the east coast of Canada are generally conducted using Sikorsky 
S92 Helicopters, a relatively large aircraft with characteristics provided in Table 4.2. Data 







Table 4.2: General characteristics of Sikorsky S-92 
Crew  2 (pilot, co-pilot) 
Capacity  19 passengers 
Length  20.88 m 
Rotor diameter  17.17 m 
Height  4.71 m 
Empty weight  7,030 kg) 
Loaded weight  12,020 kg 
Max. takeoff weight 12,568 kg 
Fuselage length  17.1 m 
Fuselage width  5.26 m 
Maximum speed  306 km/h 
Cruise speed 280 km/h 
Range  1000 km 
 
Dimensioning of the helidecks and hangars is based on this aircraft. Consideration of 
helideck arrangements are presented in the following: 
 
Ship motion and air turbulence should be minimum for the safe landing of a helicopter. A 
vessel has relatively lesser motions at the amidships, however, this competes with other 
systems installed topside, for example, deckhouse, intakes and uptakes (Lamb, 2004). 
Hence, forward and aft locations are more readily available and provide better approaches 




usually fitted at the fore part or above the wheelhouse in offshore supply vessels. A 
helideck can be placed at the aft and another at the forepart of the ORC. An advantage of 
arranging separate helidecks at the fore and aft is a safer design that isolates hazards or 
accidents on one deck from the other. 
 
Offshore vessels with helicopter refueling systems have special design and construction 
requirements. Since the ORC would be equipped with a helicopter refueling system, the 
concept is compliant with existing regulations indicated by the regulatory bodies such as 
Civil Aviation Authority, classification societies, etc. Hence, the space for Fuel Storage 
and Refueling Equipment Area, fire safety system, and electrical system is notionally 
included in the concept but would be detailed during a later design phase. 
 Emergency Equipment 
As one of the important functional requirements, the ORC would be equipped with 
emergency response (ER) equipment and supplies and an arrangement for deploying them 
when required. For the present concept, the ORC would operate as a kind of mothership 
that would coordinate operations with other vessels during emergencies. Under this 
scenario the ORC could move to the accident site for ER and work with other available 
assets or remain on station. In either case the ORC would serve as the command and 
control centre for the coordinated response. Significant space under the main deck is 
included to store the equipment and space and crane capacity is provided on the main 




safely recover persons from the water and/or other craft. A list of stored emergency 
equipment is provided below (CNLOPB, 2018; Oil and Gas, 2013b): 
 
Oil recovery equipment. Space is allocated in the ORC to store recovered oil with a 
capacity of 10,000-bbl storage.  
 
Survivor rescue equipment. The ORC would be equipped with fast rescue craft (FRC) and 
Launching Arrangements, survivor retrieval devices, climbing aids, rescue hooks, and 
lifebuoys to meet the requirements of the LSA Code, Section 2.1. 
 
Firefighting equipment. The design criteria and functional requirements would be adopted 
from firefighting ships and the guidelines are available in class rules e.g. ABS FFV 1, 
FFV 2, or FFV 3.  
 Command Centre 
A specific operational space located above the bridge deck is provided with 
communications capability and physical layout for the vessel to be a command and 
control vessel or a primary response vessel.  
4.3.4 Layout, dimensions and functional relationships 
The required elements of the ship/platform are identified considering the main features 
above and the more routine aspects of a vessel. The physical size of each element is 




land based installations. These space/area/volume requirements are represented 
graphically as a scaled block with the required size. Data for individual functional blocks 
are drawn from existing examples with the desired functionality, and individually scaled 
to fit the expected requirement of the ORC. For example, the disconnectable mooring 
turret dimensions are based on turret systems fitted to Grand Banks FPSOs but scaled 
down by estimated ship size and reduced by the exclusion of fluid piping and swivels. A 
graphical example of estimating the dimension of a hospital block is presented in Figure 










Figure 4.4: Example of functional blocks that requires space 
 
The individual blocks are then logically arranged in terms of functional 
requirements/relationships and a ship envelope created around the scaled blocks (Figure 
4.5). In this way the initial size of the overall ORC vessel is estimated and, where 
necessary, the size of functional blocks (such as engine, propulsion, fuel, turret) adjusted 
up or down based on the overall size of the ORC vessel.  This in turn lead to refinement 
of the overall ship envelope, but the process converges much the same way a 
conventional ship design spiral converges. This is a variation of the design spiral process 
adapted to allow functional elements to be drawn from different ship types and 






Figure 4.5: Function space blocks arranged within ship envelope 
 
A list of all the functional blocks are provided in Table 4.3. The development of the space 
requirements for the hospital, mooring system and helicopter operation are described in 
some detail in the following sections. These three functions were chosen as examples due 
to their relative importance in the ORC concept. They also illustrate the methods used to 










Table 4.3: List of functional blocks 




Service Food storage and service 
Medical  Hospital 


















Machinery and engine spaces 
Engine space 
Propulsion 
Bow thruster room 
Ship control systems 
Funnel 
Emergency Equipment 
Emergency equipment storage 










As a functional requirement, the ORC would have provision for medical support from a 
medical practitioner at any time. The medical facilities consist of the followings 
(Norwegian Maritime Medical Centre, 2006): 
 
- A medical unit with pharmacy and medical equipment. 
- A treatment room for ill or injured persons.  
- One to three medical practitioners who, in cooperation with doctors onshore, will 
be responsible for medical first aid and medical treatment.  
- A designated decontamination space for cleaning survivors upon retrieval and 
prevent contamination of the ORC’s medical or living spaces. 
- An enclosed area for survivor reception/triage with access to the accommodations 
that are designated for registration, distribution of sundries, etc. 
- A designated space for storing non-survivors, which should be cool, ventilated 
and illuminated. 
 
The following elements are considered when locating the ship hospital: 
- The ability to carry an injured person on a stretcher from the most likely places of 
injury to the hospital. The chance of getting an injured person from the production 
facility is higher than inbound traffic from shore. The distance from the helipad to 
the hospital facility should be a minimum. There should be easy access for patient 




avoiding stairs/ladders. Also, the location of and angles between corridors and 
doors are considered. 
- Stable enough to carry out any medical procedure if required. 
- Sufficient HVAC (including space for the equipment) is provided to regulate 
internal temperatures of the hospital space. 
 
The area of each function of the hospital is estimated based on a hospital ship, LSD-48, 
USS Ashland, Whidbey Island-class ship (Carey et al., 2002) and provided in Table 4.4. 
However, the numbers required are scaled-down as the ORC is not specifically a hospital 
ship and the capacity requirements are much lower. 
 
Table 4.4: Space for hospital 








Decontamination Area 0.51 3 40 120 
Main Laboratory 0.92 3 72 216 
Pharmacy 0.31 3 24 72 
Intensive care ward (2 beds) 0.24 3 19 57 
Survivor Reception/triage area 1.54 3 120 360 
Hospital administration (staff office and nursing station) 0.38 3 30 90 
General care ward (5 beds) 0.21 3 16 48 
Non-Survivors 0.23 3 18 54 
TOTAL SPACE FOR HOSPITAL FACILITIES 4.35 m2/pa 339 1017 
Functional block length (m)       15.07 
Functional block height (m) 
   
3 




 Mooring system 
The use of a disconnectable turret mooring in the ORC is a novel approach as the reduced 
size, and lack of fluid transfer functions make it somewhat different from existing 
examples. The space requirement is estimated based on the Terra Nova FPSO mooring 
system. The Terra Nova FPSO has a disconnectable turret mooring system and this is 
operated in a similar environmental condition.  
 
The turret position influences the mooring line tensions, weathervaning capability and the 
arrangement of other design blocks. It is easier to weathervane when the turret is moved 
further forward from the midship, although the vertical motions will increase and that will 
increase mooring line tensions. The turret location is chosen between the forward 
helideck and the accommodation blocks in the midship.  
 
Estimate space for turret. At the early stage of the ORC design, not much information is 
available and initially assumptions are made. The functional space requirement can be 
updated as the concept develops. At the beginning of the concept development, the 
mooring system space is estimated by comparing the size (displacement) of the Terra 
Nova FPSO and a Royal Canadian Navy joint support ship having a few similar 
functionalities to the ORC. Table 4.5 provides the turret specification is estimated after a 
few iterations for the projected ORC displacement. Further details of the Terra Nova 





Table 4.5: ORC turret specification 
ORC Mooring (Turret) Value Unit 
Terra Nova FPSO displacement 193000 Tonne 
Estimated volume occupied by Terra Nova FPSO mooring under deck 6380.55 m3 
ORC displacement (Iterations) 14994.64 Tonne 
Vessel displacement ratio 0.08   
Estimated volume of occupied by ORC mooring under deck 495.72 m3 
Estimated ORC height (Iterations) 10.1 m 
Terra Nova FPSO turret keel and deck diameter ratio 1.79   
Projected ORC turret diameter (Deck) 5.59 m 
Projected ORC turret diameter (Keel) 10.01 m 
 
Buoy. Similar to the Terra Nova FPSO, a spider buoy will be connected at the lower 
portion of the ORC turret. Spaces must be provided for arranging the buoy retrieval 
system and load transfer mechanism at the lower turret. The displacement ratio of the 
FPSO and the ORC is similarly used to estimate the buoy specifications. 
 Helicopter Operation 
Helidecks. There are two helidecks, fore and aft on the ORC. The helidecks require large 
deck areas and unobstructed approach paths. The spaces are determined based on the 





According to (ABS, 2015), a helicopter deck containing a circle must have a minimum 
diameter equal to the overall length (D or D-value) of the largest helicopter using the 
helicopter deck. The approach/departure sector must be at least 210° free of obstruction. 
The required minimum deck lengths for the helidecks are given in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6: Helidecks specifications 
Helideck Diameter/O.L./D-value (m) Total Area (m2) 
Deck (D-value) 21 346.36 
Obstacle free sector (0.33D) 6.93 173.25 
Total Space   519.61 




Hangar. The ORC requires a helicopter hangar to support embarked helicopters. The size 
of the hangar is dictated by the dimensions of the helicopter and clearances for access. 
There are three basic types of hangars: fixed or telescoping at the landing deck level, and 
below decks (Lamb, 2004). A fixed hangar is placed adjacent to the aft helideck at the 
same deck level. The required dimension is determined based on the specification of 








Table 4.7: Hangar specifications 
Hanger  Dimension 
Total 
Area (m2) 
Helicopter  D/O.L. = 21m and H = 5.47m   
Allowance D/O.L. + 1m  and H + 0.5m 495 
Additional space for helicopter maintenance and 
access to hospital 




Functional block length (m) 
 
23 
Functional block height (m)   5.97 
 
4.3.5 Arrangement of Functional Blocks and Overall Sizing 
After determining all the functional block dimensions using the methodology above, the 
blocks are arranged in a ship-shaped envelope. When arranging these blocks, the 
following relationships are considered: 
 
- Accommodation and hospital spaces are located above the main deck in a 
deckhouse to minimize noise and ensure habitability and safety according to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Regulations on Crew Accommodation and 
International Convention for Safety of Life (SOLAS). 
- Helipad and hangar are adjacent and located at the same level. 




- Tanks and other heavier items are placed on lower decks within the hull. 
- The ORC length is dictated by required functional deck lengths where the 
helidecks, hangar, accommodation block, mooring, emergency response 
equipment need to be placed. 
- Bridge, command centre and control tower are located such that visual 
obstructions are minimized. 
- Helidecks are placed such that enough clearance is provided to mitigate effects 
from shipped green water or wave spray. 
- Emergency equipment storage is located below the emergency equipment 
deployment area to ensure that these are easily accessible. 
- The breadth of the ORC is dictated by the helideck specification and vessel 
stability requirements. 
 
Based on these considerations, several iterations were performed, moving from the 
functional block diagram of Figure 4.5 to the concept general arrangement for the 
proposed ORC presented in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. The estimated dimensions 









Figure 4.6: The proposed ORC profile to illustrate the arrangement of all functional blocks 
 
 




4.4 Validation of Concept   
Two preliminary analyses were conducted to validate the ORC concept. These were the 
vessel stability and an analysis of the mooring loads. Stability analysis was performed to 
ensure that the dimensions of the vessel, as derived from the assembly of functional 
blocks, would provide a vessel concept with reasonable form and stability characteristics. 
This is a practical check on the dimensions of the overall vessel. The mooring analysis 
was performed to provide a check on the initial mooring dimensions derived from the 
functional block estimate for the mooring system. The platform development is an 
iterative process and these analyses provide the next iteration on the initial scoping 
provided by the functional block process. With the completion of these two analyses, the 
concept is validated as a credible platform concept that answers the requirements 
developed from the originally referenced risk analysis. Further refinement would be 
possible in later stages without changing the basic ideas embodied in the concept.   
4.4.1 Vessel Stability  
The intact stability criteria are typically evaluated early in a ship development process as 
principal dimensions are strongly influenced by stability criteria. The ORC platform 
should be compliant with general intact stability criteria for ships (IMO, 2008): 
 
“ 
- The area under the righting lever curve (GZ curve) shall not be less than 0.055 




to θ = 40° or the angle of flooding θf if this angle is less than 40°. Additionally, 
the area under the righting lever curve between the angles of heel of 30° and 40° 
or between 30° and θf, if this angle is less than 40°, shall not be less than 0.03 
metre-radians.  
- The righting lever (GZ) shall be at least 0.20 m at an angle of heel equal to or 
greater than 30°. 
- The maximum righting lever should occur at an angle of heel preferably 
exceeding 30° but not less than 25°. 
- The initial metacentric height, GM0 shall not be less than 0.15 m.” 
 
Several additional criteria should be satisfied: 
- Vessel specific rules i.e. offshore service vessel (IMO, 2008), standby vessel 
(DNV GL, 2015). 
- Severe wind and rolling criterion (weather criterion) considering the operating 
environment of the ORC (IMO, 2008). 
- Icing considerations (IMO, 2008). 
 
Although many of the normal inputs such as the loading conditions, weights and positions 
of all items, bulkhead arrangements, etc. are not firm at this stage, estimates for cg and 
weight distribution are based on similar sized and function vessels. Using the particulars 
developed in the concept design, a 3D hull model is generated. The initial hydrostatic 






Figure 4.8: ORC hydrostatics particulars 
Based on this analysis, the stability of the vessel is shown to be within the regulatory 
requirements with the overall dimensions established for the concept ORC. 
4.4.2 Mooring Analysis 
A numerical analysis of the ORC mooring system is conducted using OrcaFlex. The 
numerical model of the chain mooring layout consists of three groups of two mooring 
lines, hence a total of 6 catenary mooring lines attached to the turret buoy. The estimated 
particulars of the vessel and turret buoy in earlier sections are used to provide the vessel 
model. Each group of catenary lines or anchor legs is 120o apart and each leg consists of 




schematic diagram of the ORC mooring arrangement is provided in Figure 4.9. The 
model is simulated for a water depth of 150 m.  A total of four simulations were 
conducted for a combination of extreme and operational environmental conditions at 0 
degree and 180 degree heading of environmental loads. These two headings provided 
cases where the combined wind-wave-current load acted either on a single mooring line 
group or was applied between two groups of mooring lines. The vessel was oriented bow 









Table 4.8: Model input parameters 
Environment Parameter Value Unit 
  
  
Seabed depth  150 m 
Extreme (Heading: 0 and 180 
degree) 
Wave  
Wave spectrum JONSWAP   
Hs  16.00 m 
Tz  20.00 s 
Gamma 2.00   
Current  Speed 1.38 m/s 
Wind Speed 33.60 m/s 
Operational (Heading: 0 and 180 
degree) 
Wave 
Wave spectrum JONSWAP   
Hs  3.23 m 
Tz  8.94 s 
Gamma 1.00   
Current Speed 0.22 m/s 




Parameter Value Unit 
Line properties 
Length 850 m 
Radius from buoy 
joint 
815 m 
Cable type Chain   
Bar diameter 0.07 m 
Link type Studless   
 
The turret and buoy are connected to the ORC through a constraint object that allows the 
vessel to rotate about the z-axis only. This enables the vessel to weathervane without 
rotating the mooring lines with it. The effects of wave load (1st order), wave drift load 




are considered in the simulation. Three DOF static analysis is also included that solves 
the vessel position to equilibrium before dynamic simulation starts. Suitable added mass 
and damping coefficients are chosen based on previous similar sized vessels. For each 
case, simulation is run for 1800 seconds and the time series data of leg 3 tensions for the 
most extreme condition (Case 4: extreme weather and 0 degrees heading) is provided in 
Figure 4.10. The graph shows several peak tensions at the mooring line crossing 150 ton-
force (tef) and the maximum value reaches 320.11 tef in 1290 sec due to a large wave 
where a major portion of environmental load is transmitted to leg 3. This represents the 
worst possible scenario as it is seen from Figure 4.11 that maximum tensions are 
significantly lower than this value for other cases. Also, the maximum tension never 
exceeds the chain proof load.  
 
 




There is no doubt that the mooring concept can be further refined and considerations such 
as DP assist for extreme load cases might also be considered in future iterations as a 
means of reducing the chain size or length. However, this analysis establishes a 
reasonable first indication of an appropriate mooring concept for the ORC platform. 
 
 
Figure 4.11: Average and maximum mooring line tensions for all 4 cases 
4.5 Discussion 
In this study a vessel of approximately 160 m length is developed and demonstrated to be 
a viable conceptual solution to reduce the risk associated with isolated or low density 
offshore operations, located at extreme distances from shore bases. The main 
characteristics of the ORC are summarized in Table 4.9. The proposed concept provides 
an intermediate landing/refueling location for long range helicopter operations and a safe 




any other landing or staging point between a shore base and a remote offshore platform, a 
floating vessel type platform specifically developed for the intended purpose may provide 
the enabling technology for distant offshore developments. In the particular case studied 
here, a ship-shaped platform is selected due to favorable operating characteristics in ice 
prone environments. 
 
Since there is no previous basis ship or platform, which has the complete similarity of all 
the functional requirements of the concept ORC, the functional requirements of the ORC 
are identified and the space requirements for each functional block are estimated. The 
blocks are logically arranged to determine the required overall size of the ORC vessel. 
This method has proven to be a quick and accurate means of concept development for a 
novel installation and leads to consideration of the required functionality before 
consideration of vessel size or type. This method for combining capabilities from 
different marine platforms is shown to be a convenient and workable tool. It offers 
flexibility in concept development, which can be modified based on the relative 
importance of various attributes of the ORC and the environmental conditions. The 
method also allows alternative approaches to be considered for platform development. 
For example, it may be possible to convert an existing vessel to an ORC as an alternative 
to a new construction. The process of establishing blocks of functional space 
requirements would allow alternatives such as conversion to be evaluated in comparison 





Table 4.9: ORC Principal Dimensions and Characteristics 
Vessel LOA 159.63 m 
 Beam 22.50 m 
 Depth 10.10 m 
 Draft 5.80 m 
Mooring Type Disconnectable 
turret 
 Chain diameter 70 mm 
 Chain Length 850 m 
 Mooring legs 3×2, Catenary 
chain 
Accommodations Crew 42 persons 
 In-transit POB 36 persons 
 Temporary stay Up to 150 persons 
Helicopters Helidecks 2×Large 
helicopters e.g. 
Sikorsky S-92 




The two key functionalities considered in this study and concept development are 
helicopter operations and the disconnectable mooring system. A disconnectable turret 
mooring system is proposed for station keeping that consists of 3×2 catenary chain 




some remaining engineering uncertainty around smaller scale turret mooring system, as 
there are no similar scale vessel systems in existence, but no obvious technical obstacles 
are found in this analysis. The concept of using a disconnectable turret mooring system 
for station keeping is a mature technology with similar mooring systems used for the 
Terra Nova and SeaRose FPSOs, operating in similar environmental conditions. The 
weathervaning capability improves the ORC operability in the expected sea states and the 
disconnectable buoy enables the vessel to relocate when required. Proportionally less 
space is needed on the ORC vessel for the turret installation due to the lack of fluid 
transfer.  
 
Preliminary design analysis shows that the ship size and dimensions are reasonable and 
that the conceptually developed mooring size is practical. A static and dynamic analysis 
of the concept mooring system is conducted using the numerical analysis software, 
OrcaFlex. Result show that mooring line tensions are within the chain limits although it is 
recognized that there is likely still considerable room for further refinement. Seasonal ice 
management may also be used to reduce mooring loads and provide access of supply 
vessels for cargo handling operations or emergency response. 
 
Helicopter operations are incorporated as two full-sized landing areas at bow and stern of 
the vessel with a hangar located at the stern helicopter deck. This provides various 
options for landing, multi-helicopter operations and provision for servicing if required. 




vessel and the availability of two landing options should provide operational weather 
limits comparable to the much larger FPSO vessels. Low height helideck arrangements 
are expected to give better-operating capabilities compared to supply vessels or FPSOs 
where helidecks are often placed above the height of the wheelhouse. The aft helideck is 
likely to provide more favorable landing conditions than the forward helideck due to the 
weathervaning of the vessel, providing a generally into the wind approach. The presence 
of a hangar can facilitate the storage of helicopter (s) during storm conditions. 
 
Emergency response functionality is also incorporated into the ORC concept as this is 
also identified as a high risk issue for remote platform operations. The concept is 
developed as a forward base for response equipment and as a command and control centre 
for emergency response. Both these functions serve to improve response time which is 
essentially a risk mitigation strategy more so than the prevention strategy embodied in the 
idea of an intermediate helicopter base.  Thus the platform provides two risk reduction 
approaches for two of the major risks identified in the previous analysis of long range 
offshore production operations.  
 
The installation of an ORC with these capabilities in the presented example location 
provides a single-leg journey distance that is well within the current operating experience 
and operational limits for existing floating production platforms in the same region. The 
ORC incorporates accommodations for in-transit personnel and reserves the required 




operation in harsh environmental conditions and provides a platform to meet the 
previously identified risk reduction objectives. 
 
This ORC concept, and indeed the overall idea of reducing the logistical support or 
emergency incident risk factors by the installation of an auxiliary platform located at an 
intermediate location, represents a conceptually simple idea to enable more remote 
offshore operations. The ORC concept is shown to fit within a reasonable sized ship 
envelope, bigger than a supply vessel, but, much smaller than a production platform i.e. 
FPSO. Capital and operational costs for such a platform would be significant, but the 
development of a viable platform concept provides the first step in a full evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of such a risk reduction strategy. Further design iteration would firm up 
the concept and allow more detailed analysis of the ORC as a risk reduction strategy, 
including life cycle costs. As a technologically straightforward solution for supporting 
remote offshore operations in the North Atlantic the ORC concept should be further 
analyzed and considered.  
4.6 Conclusion 
As follow-on from a previous risk analysis of permanent offshore production operations 
in remote and environmentally challenging locations, this study presents the conceptual 
development of a moored vessel that can be used as an intermediate offshore base for 
regular logistic support operations and emergency response in a remote harsh 





- The concept of this floating vessel may reduce many operational challenges and 
risks further offshore, particularly in ice-covered regions. 
- Since there is no existing vessel/platform that can meet the required missions, a 
modular/block ship design concept is applied, where the space requirements of 
each functional block are estimated from similar ship data. 
- In the process of concept development, relevant regulations and guidelines for the 
vessel design are explored that may guide in the future for the physical 
development of this concept. 
- The concept design of the ORC suggests some unique design features such as a 
disconnectable turret mooring system and helideck configurations. The basis of 
these design features is also described. 
 
This concept development can be furthered by collecting more practical data and input 
from the industry but the concept is shown to be technically viable. A cost-benefit 
analysis should be conducted to study the economic implications of this proposed risk-
reduction strategy. This could lead to a framework to optimize the platform concept in 
both economic and technology terms. The concept here presents a start point for further 
analysis of what is thought to be one of the very few viable alternatives for the considered 
operational scenario. 
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Marine Logistics support during regular and emergency operations in remote North 
Atlantic regions is risky due to longer helicopter flying distances and extreme 
environmental conditions. In this paper, the safety and economic aspects of a previously 
introduced concept of an intermediate offshore resource centre (ORC) are evaluated 
(Rahman et al, 2020a, b). The ORC goals are to provide an intermediate helicopter 
landing station and a forward staging area for emergency response. Among many 
advantages, ORC mitigates the logistical risk associated with the extended distance from 
shore support by reducing the response time in the case of accidents. This paper focuses 
on presenting a risk-based cost-benefit analysis of the ORC. A probabilistic loss function 
model is developed based on the costs of historical offshore blowout incidents and their 
corresponding response times. The cost and benefit model is simulated in a probabilistic 
framework using a Monte Carlo simulation. The developed methodology and model help 
to assess the financial viability of an ORC assist in informed decision-making regarding 
risk reduction measures.  
Keywords: Risk Analysis; Offshore Logistic Support; Loss Modelling; Offshore Support 
Centre; Risk-based decision; Offshore Safety. 
5.1 Methodology to Develop Logistics Risk Model 
Activities in remote northern offshore regions are expected to increase, due mainly to 
available hydrocarbon resources. The extended distance from shore support and the 
inherent harsh environment comprising generally high winds and waves, fog, freezing 




maintaining regular operations (Hamilton, 2011; Khan et al., 2014; Meling, 2013; Necci 
et al., 2019). Also, a quick response cannot be provided in case of emergency due to the 
long distance between shore and the platform(s). The risk associated with the logistical 
support operations is analyzed in two previous studies (Rahman et al., 2020a,b; 2019) and 
a risk mitigating Offshore Resource Centre (ORC) concept is presented in (Figure 5.1) 
Rahman et al., 2020b. The ORC has two primary mission requirements for cases where 
an offshore development is exceptionally remote from land-based support: 
 
- Provide an intermediate point for helicopter operations that enables refueling, 
alternate landing and shorter transit distance. 
- Provide a forward staging or response asset for emergency response in case of 
fire, spill, sinking or ice damage. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: A solution for logistics support and emergency response in remote harsh 





As a risk reduction strategy, the cost of an ORC would be a significant fraction of the 
development cost for a remote offshore development. Thus it would be beneficial to have 
a rational methodology for comparing the costs and benefits of the ORC. These costs and 
benefits are evaluated in this paper based on the benefit scenario of response time 
reduction for a blowout accident. This evaluation considers only one of the two main 
functions of the proposed ORC but provides a methodology which would allow all 
functions of the intermediate platform to be evaluated by comparing costs to potential 
savings in an operational or emergency scenario.  
 
The first step is to estimate the capital cost of the ORC. There are various methods 
available for cost estimation in the shipping business. Caprace and Rigo (2012) classified 
the methods for estimating production cost into three categories, namely, top-down, 
bottom-up, and life cycle approaches. In a top-down approach, the cost of a new ship is 
estimated from the parametric relationships of similar historical ship cost data using 
statistical regression analysis. This approach does not require the detailed specifications 
of the new ship. It provides a high-level cost estimate under the assumptions that vessels 
have similar functionalities and construction procedures remain the same. In a bottom-up 
approach, the project is broken down into smaller and smaller intermediate products until 
the most basic product is described. This approach is suitable when the detailed design 




method and adapted data from other ship types as there is no historical data for the new 
concept ORC. 
 
The second stage is to estimate the life cycle cost (LCC) of the ORC, which is the present 
value of total cost that it may encounter over its life cycle. This includes building cost, 
operational cost, maintenance cost and scrap. The LCC approach is a promising holistic 
approach to estimate the cost of the overall life of a ship. Since the ORC is in the concept 
design phase, the cost estimation is possible only at a very high level and this requires 
rather broad assumptions about the ship design, its general functional requirements, and 
its physical and operational characteristics (Lamb, 2004). 
 
The capital and life cycle costs make up the cost side of the equation. The benefits arise 
from the functions of the ORC system. One of two primary functions of the ORC is to 
mitigate risk by reducing response time when a remote offshore platform is in danger. In 
general, this should minimize the loss of production or the platform. This risk reduction, 
particularly in the consequences of an accident can be considered as a financial benefit. 
Inherent in this logic is the assumption that a faster response in the case of an accident 
results in reduced loss. This is particularly true when environmental damage from a 
blowout is considered. 
 
The use of a loss function (LF) is a structured approach to estimate the loss arising from 




its optimal value. In recent years loss functions have gained wide acceptance among 
researchers and quality assurance practitioners due to Taguchi’s philosophy and quality 
improvement strategies (Zadakbar et al., 2015; Spiring, 1993). Several types of loss 
functions are found in the literature such as quadratic (Taguchi, 1986), inverted normal 
(Spiring, 1993; Khan, et al. 2016), inverted beta (Leung & Spiring, 2002), inverted 
gamma loss function (Spiring & Yeung, 1998; Leung & Spiring, 2004), etc. The loss of a 
production platform leads to production downtime, loss of material assets, loss of human 
lives and environmental damage. This loss is linked with the risk of an accident in a 
production platform.  
 
A main contributor to the total risk is the uncontrolled release of pressurized 
hydrocarbons, i.e., gas leakages and blowouts. In this paper, costs data from previous 
blowout incidents are used to develop a loss function. The details of the historical data are 
described in the case study section. Adopting a deterministic approach would be 
unsuitable due to the scarcity of data and the variability in previous accident 
circumstances. Hence, the complete analysis is conducted in a probabilistic framework 
using the Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) technique. The methodology proposed in this 
paper aims to:  
 
- estimate the building cost and operational cost of the ORC from historical ships 





- develop a loss function model from past offshore platform blowout accidents and 
project this data to present day figures (Benefit model); 
- integrate the cost and benefit model in a probabilistic framework, and  
- determine a break-even probability for an offshore development considering ORC 
as part of risk reduction strategy. 
 
The paper is organized as, Section 5.1 provide general basis of ship cost estimation and a 
review of relevant literature on LFs. The methodology of this study is presented in 
Section 5.2. A case study to demonstrate the methodology is presented in Section 5.3. 
Discussions and conclusions are presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. 
5.2 The Proposed Methodology 
The methodology proposed here comprises three elements: cost model, benefit model and 
integrated probabilistic cost - benefit comparison. The flow chart of the proposed 






Figure 5.2: Flow chart of the proposed methodology 
 
5.2.1 Cost model 
The total cost of the ORC includes capital cost and operational cost. Recent historical 
ship cost data are used to develop a capital cost model based on principal particulars, in a 
multiple linear regression. Then, the principal particulars, i.e. ship length, beam, year 
built, of the ORC, are used in the regression to develop an estimated capital cost for the 
ORC. Multiple linear regression (MLR) is a simple statistical technique that uses several 




regressions are based on the assumption that there is a linear relationship between both 
the dependent and independent variables. It also assumes no major correlation between 
the independent variables (https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/mlr.asp).  A general 
expression for a MLR model with k independent variables X1, X2, ..., Xk and a response or 
dependent variable Y, can be written as (equation 5.1): 
 
     𝑦 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 +  𝜖   (5.1) 
 
where 𝜖 is the residual term (error) of the, model and 𝛽0, 𝛽1, 𝛽2, ..., 𝛽𝑘 are the regression 
coefficients in the model.  
 
The operational cost of the ORC is the working cost over its design life. Since the ORC 
has unique functionalities, it is difficult to find an exact match with previous vessels. It is 
judged that platform supply or standby vessels are the closest comparison with the ORC. 
Considering the size of these vessels, the daily charter rate of two offshore supply vessels 
are assumed in the present case to be approximately equal to a ORC daily operational 
cost. In this way, the total operation cost of the ORC is calculated over its design life of 
25 years using 2x the current day rate of a typical northern offshore supply vessel as a 
proxy for all costs including crew, maintenance, fuel, provisioning and financing. The net 
present value (NPV) is used to estimate the current value of future payouts over the life of 




present value of cash outflows over a period of time (https://www.investopedia.com/). In 
this case we only consider cash outflows and NPV is calculated as (equation 5.2): 
 




𝑡=1           (5.2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑡 is the net cash inflow-outflows during a single period t, 𝑖 is the discount rate or 
return that could be earned in alternative investments and t  is the number of time periods. 
 
The capital cost and operational cost estimated from the process described above are 
summed to get the total cost of ORC. 
5.2.2 Benefit model 
In this study, the benefit is defined as the financial value of the reduction of loss when an 
ORC is installed as a risk mitigation measure. Emergency response would take longer to a 
remote offshore platform than it would for platforms that are closer to shore support. This 
limitation of response time was identified as a key risk factor in the previous analysis of 
remote offshore installations (Raman et al., 2019). In essence, the ORC decreases 
response time as it will be closer to a hydrocarbon facility than any shore base for 
support. Previous offshore accident data related to significant response time and the 





The next step is to develop a loss model with respect to response time for offshore 
blowout incidents. Previous blowout incidents are used to develop this model. The 
ultimate cost of a blowout incident is difficult to estimate. The cost accrues from damage 
or total loss of platform, loss of human lives, production downtime or shut down, oil 
cleanup cost and other environmental cost, liabilities and lawsuits, etc. Figure 5.3 shows 
the breakdown of total costs or maximum loss (Marsh Risk, 2011). There are some 
hidden costs arising from the revenue lost, profit not earned or reputation damaged due to 
an accident that may not be recognized under a purely financial reporting system (Lee et 
al., 2018). For instance, BP reported the total costs of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as 
62.59 billion USD, which includes charges and expenses directly related to the spill, the 
various fines and penalties to be paid, reimbursements and recoveries from other parties, 
and securities-related charges. However Lee et al., 2018 estimated the ultimate cost of 
this disaster as 144.89 billion USD including the hidden costs.  
 
The additional cost is largely influenced by the environmental cleanup cost that depends 
on the occurrence of a spill and the location of the accident. In general, cleanup cost 
increases when a spill occurs and rises exponentially when an oil spill occurs near to 
shore. In addition the damage to company reputation, share value etc. is also likely 
increased by the increased publicity associated with spills that damage shorelines. 
Examples of this type of loss include the Deepwater Horizon and the Exxon Valdez spill. 
To address the hidden cost issue, an environmental cleanup factor is introduced to capture 




spills that damage shorelines is essentially the ratio between costs as estimated by BP for 
the Deepwater Horizon incident and the higher cost calculated by Lee et al., 2018 A 
lower but arbitrary cleanup factor is used for cases where a spill occurs but does not 
impinge on a shoreline. All historical cost data collected from the literature are converted 
to present value for the year 2020 by considering inflation rates.  
 
 
Figure 5.3: Breakdown of overall blowout loss 
 
Statistical parameters are derived from the inflated accident cost data set and are used to 
generate a Cumulative Density Function (CDF) for financial losses associated with an 
offshore blowout. An appropriate probability distribution is selected that best fits the data. 
Parameters are estimated using the least square method. The same process is applied to 
generate a CDF for emergency response time based on the statistical parameters derived 




comparing the CDFs of costs and response time and equating the cost values and response 
time values based on equal values of cumulative probability. This provides a curve of 
accident cost as a function of response time based on equal cumulative probability of 
occurrence.  
 
The final step in the setup process is to derive a curve of response time as a function of 
offshore distance. This is based on the available data and, like all the data in this study, is 
limited by the relatively small sample of offshore blowout accidents. Furthermore our 
study considers a very remote platform and thus the distance for the unsupported platform 
is well outside the range of previous accidents. In extrapolating the limited information 
available we have assumed that the response time would increase exponentially as 
distance offshore increases. 
5.2.3 Aggregate cost and benefit model  
The cost and benefit models described in section 5.2.1 and section 5.2.2 are integrated to 
calculate the net, which is referred as “residual risk” (Rr). The steps are as follows:  
(1) Estimate the capital and operating costs for the ORC with operating costs for 25 
years reduced to a net present value 
(2) For a given accident scenario, the required response time is derived from response 
time vs offshore distance curve for the platform without the presence of an ORC.  





(4) Use the reduced distance between the ORC and offshore platform to calculate a 
reduced response time 
(5) Repeat step 3 to calculate the reduced costs of accident using the response time 
with the support of the ORC. 
(6) Determine the difference in loss costs for the with-ORC and without-ORC cases. 
(7) Compare the difference in loss costs with the expense of acquiring and operating 
an ORC. Develop a break-even accident probability based on a cost vs accident 
probability curve.  
 
Hence, Rr is determined as (equation 5.3): 
 
𝑅𝑟 =  𝑃𝑎(𝐿 − 𝐿𝑂𝑅𝐶) − (𝐶𝑝 +  𝐶𝑜)           (5.3) 
 
Where 𝑃𝑎 represents the probability of accident, 𝐿 is the cost of the accident calculated 
from the loss function, 𝐿𝑂𝑅𝐶 is the cost of the accident when the ORC is installed. 𝐶𝑝 and 
𝐶𝑜 represent the capital cost and operational cost of the ORC, respectively. Risk is 
defined as the multiplication of probability and consequence. The consequence of an 
accident is often expressed as loss.  
 
In this study, the probability of blowout incidents is unknown but the design level for 
offshore systems is frequently in the range of 10-5. Despite this, blowout accidents have 




determine that an ORC is a positive investment if the value of Rr is positive. Thus another 
way to consider the analysis is to determine what accident probability makes Rr greater 
than zero. 
5.2.4 Uncertainty analysis 
It is recognized that the historical cost and historical accident data used in this study are 
not entirely sufficient but these are the only data available as cost data is not widely 
available and offshore accidents, although well studied in recent years, have been 
mercifully few. The data paucity requires that, for the purposes of this analysis, several 
assumptions are made. The Monte Carlo simulation technique is adopted as an additional 
way to address this limitation. In this approach, a probability distribution of each cost part 
is used instead of a deterministic value. It is assumed that all calculated costs and benefits 
are normally distributed with mean (most likely) values calculated from the available data 
and standard deviations either based on regression data (in the case of ship costs) or 
assumed equal to 20% of the corresponding mean value. The Monte Carlo simulations are 
run for n times and a histogram is ultimately generated for 𝑅𝑟 using equation 5.3. The 
characteristics i.e. mean, 50th percentile, etc. of this distribution are further investigated to 
inform the decision on the viability of an ORC. 
5.3 The Application of the Proposed Methodology: Case Study 
5.3.1 Example location of ORC 
The Flemish Pass Basin is chosen for a case study to illustrate the cost-benefit analysis of 




Flemish Pass basin is located approximately 500 nautical miles offshore St. John’s, 
Newfoundland and Labrador. Equinor Canada Ltd. (Equinor) is proposing to conduct an 
exploration drilling project in the Flemish Pass Basin between 2019 and 2027 (Canada 
Impact Assessment Act, 2019) although this is currently uncertain due to low oil prices.  
 
As conceptualized in the previous study, the proposed ORC would be located at an 
intermediate location between the shore (St. John’s) base and the drilling sites (Rahman et 
al., 2020a,b). The ORC concept includes defining functional requirements, initial 
dimensions estimation and addressing some critical design features required to operate at 
the selected site. Table 5.1 provides the basic characteristics of the proposed ORC. The 
following sections describe the cost estimation for this ORC, loss approximation for a 
hypothetical offshore blowout incident and analysis of loss cost reduction through the use 
of the ORC as a risk reduction measure. 
 
Table 5.1: ORC Principal Dimensions and Characteristics 
Vessel LOA 159.63 m 
 Beam 22.50 m 
 Depth 10.10 m 
 Draft 5.80 m 
Mooring Type Disconnectable turret 
 Chain diameter 70 mm 
 Chain Length 850 m 
 Mooring legs 3×2, Catenary chain 
Accommodations Crew 42 persons 
 In-transit POB 36 persons 
 Temporary stay Up to 150 persons 
Helicopters Helidecks 2×Large helicopters e.g. Sikorsky S-92 




5.3.2 Cost estimation of the ORC 
As mentioned earlier, the ORC is a unique vessel type that does not match with any 
existing type of ship. At the concept stage, it is not possible to estimate cost by detail 
calculation of every part of the vessel system. Thus, to make a reasonable initial estimate, 
building cost data from recent cruise ships are used. Cruise ships fall into a middle 
category in terms of ship construction complexity as these vessels are less expensive than 
military ships but generally more expensive than similar sized commercial cargo or 
working ships. The construction cost of an ORC may also fall into the middle range of 
construction complexity considering the machinery requirements i.e. turret mooring, 
accommodation and recreational facilities and provision for aviation facilities. This shows 
some justification for comparing the costs of cruise ships and the expected cost of an 
ORC. Furthermore construction cost data for cruise vessels is readily available and 
appears to be less variable than the data available for other ship types. The construction 
costs of different cruise ships having overall length between 157m – 200m and beam 







Figure 5.4: Cruise ships building costs vs year 
 
A multiple linear regression is conducted where year, ship’s length and beam are 
independent variables and ship construction cost is the dependent variable. Using the 
corresponding length, beam and current year, the construction costs of the ORC is 
calculated as 252 million USD. Table 5.2 provides the summary of this regression 










Table 5.2: Regression analysis of ORC cost 
ANOVA 
        df SS MS F Significance F 
 Regression 3.00 62735.68 20911.89 35.87 1.43E-07 
 Residual 17.00 9912.13 583.07 
   Total 20.00 72647.81     
 
         Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Intercept -10466.58 1128.71 -9.27 0.00 -12847.95 -8085.21 
Year Built 5.24 0.58 9.09 0.00 4.02 6.46 
Ship Length OA (m) 0.46 0.51 0.90 0.38 -0.62 1.54 
Ship Beam (m) 2.66 5.40 0.49 0.63 -8.74 14.06 
 
𝑂𝑅𝐶 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑈𝑆 𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠) = 5.24 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑡 + 0.46 ×
𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑂𝐴 (𝑚) + 2.66 × 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑚 (𝑚)                      (5.4) 
 
Operational cost of the ORC is calculated from the day rates of US Gulf supply vessels 
based on data available for 2017 (https://www.workboat.com/resources/reports/osv-day-
rates/ ). The cost is considered to be doubled by comparing the physical and expected 
crew sizes of the ORC with typical north Atlantic supply boats. Next, the cost is 
converted to net present value for an operation life of 25 years and a discount rate of 5%. 
At the present time no allowance is made for inflation or cost changes over the life of the 





Table 5.3: Total costs of ORC 
Daily rate of a supply ship $25,000  USD 
Estimated ORC daily rate (2 times of a supply ship compared 
to their size) $50,000  USD 
Annual ORC cost $18,250,000  USD 
NPV Operating cost (5% discount rate for 25 years) $257,214,488.33 USD 
Operation cost $257.21  Million USD 
Building cost $252.11  Million USD 
Total life cycle cost of ORC $509.32 Million USD 
 
5.3.3 Offshore blowouts and corresponding loss function 
Offshore oil production is a complex operation. To ensure safe operations all equipment 
has to be functional and correct decisions have to be made. There is a significant risk 
associated with undesirable events that may lead to minor or major production loss. 
Minor events such as near-miss, dropped objects, or production interruptions are more 
frequent than major accidents involving significant spills or major damage or platform 
loss. This study focuses on the case of a catastrophic offshore accident (blowout) that 
represents maximum consequence or loss. There is a relatively small number of historical 
offshore blowouts. The most costly and latest blowout event is the Macondo well 
explosion that occurred on April 20, 2010. The platform was located approximately 50 
miles off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. This accident caused 11 fatalities, 




reported 4 million barrels of released hydrocarbons (CSB report, 2016). The Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill is regarded as one of the largest environmental disasters in North 
America. Lee et al., 2018 estimated an ultimate cost to British Petroleum (BP) of $144.89 
billion, which is more than two times larger than the $62.59 billion BP reported in its 
income statement.  
 
The Montara wellhead blowout is another recent disaster that happened on August 21, 
2009, and which is considered one of the largest in Australian history. The Montara field 
is located 160 miles off the Kimberley coast in the Timor Sea. There were no fatalities or 
injuries, however, according to the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), the oil 
slick spread over 6,000km2 and killed significant marine life in the area. Unlike the 
Macondo incident, the Montara accident did not have effects on any coastline although 
the Indonesian government has claimed damages (https://www.offshore-
technology.com/features/montara-oil-spill-timeline/). 
 
The Piper Alpha explosion disaster on July 6, 1988, killed 167 people making it the 
incident with the highest fatality level. This platform was operating in the North Sea 
approximately 120 miles north-east of Aberdeen, Scotland (Oil & Gas UK, 2008). The 
total loss from the Piper Alpha explosion was estimated to be $1.6 billion. Initial 
emergency response arrived after a few hours of the accident, due significantly to the 
proximity of other production platforms. The platform was completely lost, but no oil 





The Ekofisk Bravo explosion in April 1977, was the largest blowout in the North Sea. 
The platform was located about 200 miles offshore southwest of Stavanger. All crew 
members on board were safely evacuated. The blowout caused a continuous discharge of 
crude oil through an open pipe 20 meters above the sea surface that took 7 days to stop 
completely. Approximately 80,000–126,000 barrels of oil spilled during this period 
(https://incidentnews.noaa.gov/incident/6237).  
 
The Santa Barbara oil spill occurred on January 28, 1969, due to a blowout 6 miles 
offshore of Santa Barbara, California. The blowout resulted in about 100,000 barrels of 
oil spilled that quickly hit the near shore (https://incidentnews.noaa.gov/incident/6206). 
Cost and other data for this incident are not widely available. 
 
The summary data pertinent to this study for each blowout incident are provided in Table 
5.4. In general there is much more information available for the two recent incidents than 
there is available for the three older incidents. The literature study suggests that oil 
cleanup cost was typically much higher when the spill happened near to the shore. Thus, 
higher arbitrary environmental cost factors are chosen for BP Mocando and Santa Barbara 
blowouts. The total costs of these accidents in the year 2020 are projected considering 






Table 5.4: Previous offshore blowouts 




























BP Macondo 2010 62.6 3 87 41 1.192 74.6 2.3 171.6 
Australia 
Montara 2009 1 9 75 160 1.188 1.2 1.2 1.4 
Piper Alpha 1988 1.6 1 10 120 2.252 3.6 1 3.6 
Ekofisk Bravo 1977 0.75 2 7 200 4.498 3.4 1.2 4.0 
Santa Barbara 1969 0.2 1 90 6 7.361 1.5 2.3 3.4 
 
The significant response time in days is the time taken to mount an effective emergency 
response at the accident site. This would not count initial efforts to rescue or aid survivors 
from nearby vessels or first-on-site aircraft, but would be the start of efforts to salvage the 
platform or deal with the blowout itself. Logically, a significant emergency response 
takes longer to reach an incident as the distance of the platform from the shore support 
base increases. A response time vs offshore distance curve is plotted in Figure 5.4 based 
on the data presented in Table 5.4. The graph shows a similar correlation to that stated 
above but there is clearly a great deal of variability. Part of this variability can be 
associated with the availability of resources and infrastructure from other similar 
operations in the region of the incident. This factor would tend to reduce response times 
in regions such as the North Sea or the Gulf of Mexico and increase response times in 




It is recognized that the data is limited. Also, there are several other factors that may 
affect the speed of response. More detail of other limitations is presented in the preceding 
study, Rahman et al., 2019. An exponential curve is fitted in Figure 5.5 relating response 
time and distance. This fit curve indicates that it would take slightly over 12 days to 
respond for the example location, which is about 500 miles offshore. Placing an ORC in 
an intermediate position would reduce the response time considerably, to approximately 
four days. In the present case we assume the ORC is located at the mid-point between 
shore and the offshore platform location within 250 miles of the production platform, but 









Next, the mean and standard deviation of the blowout costs and response time data are 
used to generate two corresponding cumulative density functions (CDFs). The data are 
tested for goodness of fit using various probability distribution and similar curves are 
found. In this study, the normal distribution was found to provide a good fit and is used to 
model blowout cost (Figure 5.6) and response time (Figure 5.7).  
 
 
Figure 5.6: CDF of blowout cost 
 
 




A loss curve (Figure 5.8) is generated by comparing the CDFs of the loss costs and the 
response time and equating the loss values and response time values, based on equal 
levels of cumulative probability. This provides a curve of accident loss cost as a function 
of response time based on equal probability of occurrence. The loss function shows that 
loss increases at a lower rate if the response can be marshalled within 2 days. After that 
the loss increases sharply as the response time increases and reaches a maximum at 11 
days. This statistical model is consistent with the information in the available historical 
literature on offshore incidents as delayed response generally resulted in a higher cleanup 
and environmental costs.  
  
 





5.3.4 Comparison of Cost-benefits and Monte Carlo simulations 
The estimated cost of the ORC in section 5.3.2 and the difference in loss costs for the 
with-ORC and without-ORC cases using the models developed in section 5.3.3 are 
integrated in this section to provide the cost-benefit model. The residual risk is calculated 
using equation 5.3. The probability of an accident, 𝑃𝑎 is needed to get the complete risk 
profile. A positive residual risk means the value of the reduced risk due to the presence of 
the ORC is greater than the cost of providing the ORC, for a given value of the 
probability of a blowout incident. The residual risk is higher when the probability of an 
accident is increased.  
 
Due to the inherent uncertainty in the available accident data, the Monte Carlo simulation 
technique is used to determine a distribution of outcomes. A probability distribution of 
each element in equation 5.3 is used instead of a deterministic value. It is assumed that 
costs are normally distributed with mean (most likely) values calculated from the loss 
functions and standard deviations either based on regression data (in the case of ship 
capital cost) or assumed equal to 20% of the corresponding mean value. The simulations 
are run 1000 times for a given probability of accident. A sample simulation is provided in 
Table 5.5. Figure 5.9 shows a histogram for residual risk (𝑅𝑟) when it is assumed that a 
blowout has occurred i.e. the probability is 1. The mean, standard deviation, 5th percentile 
and 95th percentile are also given. These values represent the probable highest residual 
risk or the maximum net value that can be gained through the installation of an ORC for 










Loss cost in Billion 
USD 
Probability of accident 
𝑃𝑎  
Without 
ORC 500 12.61 200.00 1.0000 
With ORC 250 4.20 58.98   
  




Loss without ORC 
(Billion USD) 
L 
Loss with ORC 
(Billion USD) 
LORC 
Capital cost of ORC 
(Billion USD) 
Cp 
Operational cost of 
ORC (Billion USD) 
Co 
Expected 200.00 58.98 0.25 0.26 
Standard 
Deviation 40.00 11.80 0.02 0.05 
First 
simulation 183.00 75.62 0.23 0.29 
Residual 








Figure 5.10 shows the mean and standard deviation of residual risk for different 
probabilities of blowout accident. It shows that the mean and standard deviation of the 
residual risk decreases as the probability of accident decreases. The risk becomes zero 
when the probability is approximately 0.00365, which is the breakeven point. Hence, 
ORC is a net benefit when the probability of accident is higher than the breakeven point. 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Mean and SD of residual risk vs probability of accident 
 
5.4 Discussion 
The study presents a methodology to analyze the economic costs and benefits of an ORC 
as a risk reduction measure for use in a remote harsh offshore environment. The capital 
cost and operational costs are determined based on comparable historic ship cost data. A 
high level approximation approach is adopted rather than a detailed analysis of 




phase. However, the total estimated life-cycle cost of an ORC in this study is judged to be 
reasonable, comparing with similar sized and similarly complex ships.  
 
In the second part, a loss curve is developed using the available data from previous 
blowout accidents. The total blowout costs, response time, offshore distance and other 
relevant details of these accidents are examined. These data are assumed to be normally 
distributed. However, several other distributions were tested during the study, and all 
distributions show a similar trend.  
 
The limitation of the source data is a challenge. This includes both the ship cost data and 
the accident data. Thus this methodology proposes a probabilistic approach that shows 
20% uncertainty in the predicted values. The process is repeated multiple times using the 
Monte Carlo simulation technique. The reduced logistical risk due to the ORC is 
indicated by the positive residual risk which is an unknown. The net benefit for installing 
an ORC is highly dependent on the probability of a blowout accident. Figure 5.11 shows 
the breakeven probability of 0.00365 for this case study. This is a relatively low 
probability but not nearly as low as the design probabilities for offshore system failures. 
The x-axis represents probability of negative residual risk in percentage. It is the 
percentage frequency of occurrence of the negative residual risk in the total number of 
simulations. The upper bound and lower bound probabilities are 0.01 and 0.001. Any 




ORC and any value less than 0.001 would result in a negative return. This would mean 
that a net increase in safety has a net cost. 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Sensitivity of blowout probability and residual risk 
 
The emphasis of this study is to demonstrate the methodology and the numerical outputs 
are not absolute but based on reasonable estimates and available data. Also, the benefit of 
an ORC is only evaluated for one of its two main functions, emergency response and in 
this case for only one possible accident type. Another main objective of the ORC is 
providing helicopter landing facilities. Long flying distance is a major logistical 






It may be possible to use a similar methodology, to that employed here, to evaluate the 
additional net benefit associated with a reduction in flying distance. This is expected to be 
more challenging than the current case as a loss function associated with helicopter flying 
distance is expected to be more difficult to generate using historical data. This may in fact 
be superseded by a more simple analysis of helicopter range. If the platform is simply 
outside the safe range this would yield a simple comparison between the ORC concept 
and any available alternatives such as the use of existing intermediate production 
platforms or possibly an all-ship logistical support system. In either event, there are 
additional benefits associated with the other functions of the ORC that would be 
considered in a full analysis.  
 
The ORC provides several additional benefits that are not risk reduction functions and 
thus not subject to the methodology presented here. For example the hotel function of the 
ORC provides temporary accommodation for inbound/outbound offshore personnel that 
may be useful for either aircraft operations or marine operations. Though this function is 
not a risk reduction objective, it offers an alternative crew transportation approach. 
 
The study has set up a foundation for systematically analyzing the economic aspects of an 
ORC or any other form of technology based risk reduction initiatives. This approach can 
be expanded to include other functions or adapted for analyzing more complex scenarios 
such as, cost-benefit modeling of an ORC supporting more than one platform. The 




fire, explosion, etc. For any given accident case, both probability and loss/consequence 
needs to be developed to get a complete risk profile. An offshore blowout was selected as 
a case study due to a relatively large data set of historical accidents and because the 
catastrophic nature of such accidents provides a very large potential loss that makes the 
case presented here easier to demonstrate.  
5.5 Conclusions 
The paper presents a probabilistic cost-benefit analysis method applied to the concept of 
an offshore resource centre in support of remote offshore operation. The methodology 
comprises estimating the total cost of ORC, developing loss model for blowout type 
accidents, determining the reduced loss as benefit, integrating cost-benefit models and 
uncertainty analysis. The proposed methodology and model provides: 
 
- A basis for risk-based cost-benefit analysis that helps to assess the net financial 
cost or benefit of using a system such as an ORC as a risk reduction strategy for 
remote offshore developments. 
- A structured but flexible approach that can be easily modified for different 
scenarios. Although this was developed for a particular system related to remote 
offshore developments, the same methods would apply to any potential risk 
mitigation system. 
- A demonstration of the use of the Monte Carlo simulation technique, in a case 




range of possible outcomes and thus a more credible output than deterministic 
modeling. 
 
This methodology could be further improved if more data were available. However it is, 
in fact, preferable that accidents not occur, despite their value for studies such as this. 
Thus we sincerely hope that there are not any future additions to the available data on 
blowout accidents and we accept the limitations of this study as a benefit of a safer 
offshore industry. It would however be relatively easy to improve the ORC capital and 
operating cost information by performing a more detailed engineering feasibility study of 
the ORC concept.  
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6. Summary, Conclusions and Future works 
6.1 Summary 
Remote offshore logistics support operations in harsh environmental conditions are 
challenging. Logistics challenges arise significantly from the two factors of extreme 
weather conditions and remoteness. The literature indicates that existing means of 
logistics support using helicopters or supply vessels alone may not be sufficient in far 
offshore operation in extreme environmental conditions. The risk modeling developed for 
this work identifies the most significant contributing factors to logistics challenges and 
the most effective risk reduction measures to mitigate these challenges. An intermediate 
offshore resource centre (ORC) is identified as an effective risk reduction measure and 
proposed as a supplement to conventional vessel and helicopter operations in order to 
mitigate the challenges, and an economic model is developed to analyze its practicability. 
This study identifies the unique challenges associated with this particular type of offshore 
development and proposes a solution to overcome these. Furthermore the work presents a 
means of analyzing the risk reduction effectiveness in economic terms. The outcomes of 
this research are summarized in the following. 
Objective 1. To understand logistical risk in remote offshore operations 
An advanced fault tree model is developed to perform risk analysis of offshore logistics 
operations. The inherent limitations of this model are identified. The model limitations 
are addressed by introducing unconventional logic gates. The data limitations are 




provides more realistic results than the traditional fault tree model. The risk analysis 
suggests that marine logistics operations cannot respond sufficiently quickly in the case of 
an emergency on a distant platform. Helicopter operations are limited by the 
environmental conditions and flying range and aircraft capacity. This phase of the study 
identifies that new solutions are required to address this additional risk associated these 
challenges. 
Objective 2. To identify effective risk reduction measures 
Several alternate risk reduction measures to address logistical challenges identified in the 
first phase are evaluated. The BN model developed in this research is used to analyze the 
feasibility of each measure. This framework is applicable for a quantitative risk analysis 
for any given set of data. Two measures are found to be the highest ranked in terms of 
effectiveness in reducing the risk associated with distance and environment. These are the 
offshore refuge and an additional layer of safety equipment inventory.  
Objective 3. To develop the concept of a viable solution   
The concept developed as intermediate offshore resource centre (ORC) meets the purpose 
of a temporary refuge during emergencies and provides an emergency response asset for 
quicker reaction to an emergency scenario. The ORC also reduces risk associated with 
helicopter operations by reducing flying distance and by providing an intermediate 
landing point in case of emergency. The functional requirements of the ORC are set based 
on the example geographical location and the required capacity for supporting a single 




can be used for any other case study or to develop a vessel or platform for supporting 
multiple offshore installations. Preliminary performance criteria such as ORC stability 
and station keeping in North Atlantic regions are also investigated to provide a concept 
level validation of the vessel. 
Objective 4. To develop a framework to assess economic viability 
In the final chapter this study develops a framework that can be used to determine 
whether an ORC, or any other risk reduction measure, is beneficial in economic terms by 
estimating risk reduction in economic terms and comparing this to the investment 
required in the risk reduction measure. The results in the present case indicate that the 
benefits of an ORC are significantly dependent on the assumed probability of a serious 
accident over the lifetime of the structure. 
6.2 Technical Challenges and Limitations 
The biggest challenge faced during this research is the scarcity of data on both operations 
in remote harsh regions and on the probability and consequences of major offshore 
accidents. This is mainly due to the fact there is simply not much experience with either. 
In the case of accidents, this is a good thing but it does make risk analysis and projections 
more difficult. Most of the data are collected from open literature. Some essential data for 
this study are not at all available. This is addressed either by logical assumption or expert 
elicitation. The case studies presented in this study are for demonstration purpose and 
provide clear indications of the logic and utility of the developed methods. However, care 




Apart from the data limitation, logistics support operation in a remote and harsh offshore 
environment is a complex process that involves many co-dependent factors. In general, 
risk modelling of such a process is a complicated task and often requires logical 
assumptions to address model-based limitations. This model can be further improved by 
incorporating experts’ opinions from the offshore industry. Also, in this study, any 
factor/event in the risk model is considered to have binary states (pass/fail). However, 
multi-state factors can be considered in a more detailed modelling approach to represent a 
more practical scenario. 
 
A literature review is performed to provide the perception of risk related to offshore 
helicopter operations. Although, detailed risk analysis of remote helicopter operations in 
extreme environments is not conducted in this study. A similar approach can be employed 
for helicopter risk analysis, though the required data is expected to be challenging to 
obtain.  
 
The risk reduced by the ORC by enhancing helicopter operations is not analyzed in this 
study. Also, operating an ORC in remote and harsh offshore environments has its own 
risk elements. Further analysis would be required to gain a better understanding where all 
the risk elements of logistics support functions interlinked with shore base, ORC and 
production platform are considered in an integrated framework. Also, the role of standby 




Some of the technical uncertainties of the ORC such as motion analysis are also not 
performed as part of this study. The limitations of helicopter landing/take-off on the ORC 
imposed by weather or other technical issues should be evaluated in subsequent phases of 
the design spiral. Logistics transfer issues associated with rough weather conditions (e.g. 
high winds, waves, freezing rain) to/from a vessel and ORC also need to be further 
considered. 
6.3 Recommendations and Future Work 
Based on Based on some limitation of this work and on areas that could not be covered 
within the bounds of a single PhD study, the following future research work is 
recommended: 
 
- The study presents a generic fault tree and BN model for a given case study. The 
proposed model can be modified based on region-specific features, and analysis should be 
performed using suitable probability data available for that region. Feedback from two 
experts with similar education and experience levels are considered in this study. More 
data from experts with diverse backgrounds such as academicians, ships’ captains, and 
other offshore personnel can be incorporated when available. A weighting factor can be 
introduced based on the profession and experience of the experts.  
 
- Only discrete probabilities are used in the risk models. More robust estimation can 




the probability of some incidents such as the presence of iceberg, fog, etc. will vary over 
a year. 
 
- Human error is considered as one parameter in this study, which could be a 
combination of a series of nodes that would represent different modes of human-related 
failure. With a more detailed literature review and practical datasets, the accuracy of this 
human error aspect can be further improved.  
- The proposed ORC is in the concept development phase, which can be furthered 
by collecting more practical data and input from the industry and subsequently 
developing a further iteration on the design possibly through an engineering design study.  
 
- The ORC concept is developed to minimize some of the challenges of logistics 
support operation to one oil production platform. In the case study, the space requirement 
and thus the overall dimensions of the ORC are estimated to meet the functional 
requirements for logistics supply to a single platform. However, the concept and the 
approach would remain the same for a design supporting multiple oil field operations. 
The space requirement can be determined using a similar approach presented in the case 
study based on the demand for multiple platforms. For example, if there are two platforms 
to support, more space will be required for in-transit personnel accommodation, service, 
fuel storage due to increased helicopter operations, etc. Indeed, the ORC could be more 






- The case study presented in this paper selected offshore Newfoundland to 
illustrate the concept development of an ORC. Some aspects of the concept are dictated 
by the geographical location, bathymetry and the physical environments. However, the 
basic requirements are dictated by the distance offshore for the production platform which 
is not site-specific. The environment is a somewhat lesser influence on the concept. For 
different environmental conditions such as the Gulf of Mexico or off Coast Brazil would 
need to be considered in a concept development that includes tropical storms and 
hurricanes, but no threat of dynamic ice or icebergs. Also, in deep water (> 500m), 
dynamic positioning (DP) could be the better option for station keeping. When the 
platform type and positioning system are defined, the modular concept development 
approach presented in the study can be implemented to determine the principal particulars 
of an ORC.  
 
- In the cost-benefit analysis, the estimation of ORC capital and operating cost 
information by performing a more detailed engineering feasibility study. A more detail 
optimization problem can be solved considering multiple platforms and various accident 
scenarios. 
 
- Some additional benefits of an ORC are not considered in the cost-benefit analysis 
presented here. The most significant additional risk reduction feature is the reduction of 




analysis may consider the reduced risk cost of long-distance helicopter operation 
associated with the ORC as an additional benefit to be compared with the required 
investment. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This study provides an analysis that identifies the major challenges of operating offshore 
installations in harsh northern regions at increased distances from shore based support. 
Although experience in this type of operation is currently very limited, developments that 
meet these criteria are under active consideration. This study presents an approach to risk 
analysis specifically adapted to the circumstances. A novel technological concept to 
mitigate the most significant identified risks is presented and validated in both technical 
and risk reduction terms. The method of comparing risk cost and investment provides a 
rational means of evaluating this or any other risk reduction approach. It is hoped that 
these ideas, methods and concepts will make a positive contribution to offshore safety as 
new developments are considered and implemented. 
